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INTRODUCTION

The employment provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA"), which prohibit discrimination against disabled employees and
applicants, became effective on July 26, 1992. 1 As is the case with most
employee protective legislation, unions were among the supporters of

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A. 1973, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; M.A. 1974, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; J.D. 1981,
Northwestern University. This Article benefited from comments on earlier drafts and discussions
of the issues with Michael B. Erp and Martha A. Garcia of Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle,
Connye Y. Harper, Associate General Counsel, UAW, Sandra Scott Ziegler, Senior Attorney
Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the
participants of the University of Richmond Law Faculty Colloquium. The conclusions and any
errors herein are solely those of the author. I also acknowledge the valuable research assistance of
Nicole.R. Beyer, Class of 1994, Bich Quyen Nguyen, J.D. 1993, and Penny Elaine Nimmo, Class
of 1994, University of Richmond School of Law. Grants from the Hunton & Williams Summer
Research Fund provided financial support.
1. President Bush signed the ADA (Pub. L. 101-336, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 327-378) on
July 26, 1990. The employment provisions covering employers with twenty-five or more
employees took effect on July 26, 1992. Effective July 26, 1994, the Act will cover employers
with fifteen or more employees.
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the ADA, but Congress appears to have given little thought to the implications of the ADA for the unionized workplace.2 Unlike the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 3 after which it was patterned,
the ADA covers labor organizations. But in contrast to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act,4 which also covers labor organizations, the ADA does
not contain language expressly defining the nondiscrimination obligations of unions. 5 Thus, there is no statutory blueprint fqr applying the
ADA in the unionized workplace.
This Article explores the issues raised by application of the ADA in
the organized6 employment setting. The Article begins with an overview of the statute and then analyzes its applicability in the unionized
workplace. In addition to recommending changes in the statute and regulations to clarify the obligations of employers and unions under the
ADA, the Article makes recommendations with respect to judicial interpretation of the statute in three major areas. In Sections III C through E,
the Article analyzes the circumstances under which the union should be
held liable for discrimination, recommending that courts assess liability
based on the union's actions with respect to disability discrimination and
not solely on the basis of status as a party to the collective bargaining
agreement.
Section III F analyzes the statutory accommodation obligation and
points out several potential conflicts between statutory obligations
imposed by the ADA and those imposed by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which governs union-management relations. 7
2. See S. REP. No. 116, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989). As one commentator noted, the
issues created by application of the ADA in the unionized workplace result from the intersection
of the individual rights model of workplace regulation and the "industrial pluralist model of
collective bargaining". See Richard A. Bales, Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act:
Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2 CORNELL J.L. &
Pus. PoL'v 161, 164 (1992). Another commentator describes the problem as one created by the
dichotomy between public and private rights and proposes modifications of the arbitration system
to allow employees to vindicate public rights effectively in the arbitral forum. See Robert J.
Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 242-63 (1991).
While Rabin does not focus specifically on the ADA, he does analyze the problems created when
a disabled worker's statutory rights conflict with the rights of other workers under the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 244-49.
3. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities by federal agencies, federal contractors and federal fund recipients. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 791, 793-795 ( 1988).
4. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1988).
5. Title VII contains express provisions defining unlawful discrimination by unions. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1988). The ADA defines "covered entity" to include labor organizations and
prohibits discrimination by covered entities. ADA§§ 101(2), 102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112
(Supp. II 1990).
6. The Article uses the terms "unionized" and "organized" interchangeably.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-303 (1988). The NLRA covers private employers in interstate
commerce. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
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These potential conflicts include conflicts between the ADA's requirements and collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to the
NLRA. 8 The Article makes several recommendations to resolve the
conflicts and effectuate accommodation of employees with disabilities.
First, the confidentiality requirements of the statute should be interpreted to allow disclosure to the union and affected employees of information about the employee's disability that is necessary to accomplish
an effective accommodation. Second, the employer should be required
to discuss with the union any accommodations that affect terms and conditions of employment. In addition, where an accommodation would
adversely affect the collectively bargained rights· of other employees, the
courts should find that undue hardship relieves the union and the
employer of the duty to accommodate. Nevertheless, the ADA permits
agreements to accommodate in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, and the Article recommends that challenges to such agreements by other employees be rejected in the absence of evidence of discriminatory motive.
Finally, Section III G reviews the impact of grievance arbitration
under the collective bargaining agreement on claims under the ADA.
While commending grievance arbitration as ah effective method for
resolving disability discrimination issues in many cases, the Article recommends that judicial action· under the ADA remain available to the
employee regardless of the outcome of any grievance arbitration.
These recommendations will best accommodate the purposes of
both the NLRA and the ADA by minimizing litigation where possible,
while protecting the rights of all employees.

II.

OVERVIEW OF THE

ADA

Congress passed the Americans With Disabilities Act in 1990 to
address the problem of discrimination against the estimated 43 million
Americans with disabilities, which Congress concluded costs billions of
dollars because of unnecessary dependency and nonproductivity. 9 The
statute contains provisions directed at employment, transportation, public accommodation, and telecommunications. 10 The employment provisions, contained in Title I, prohibit discrimination against "a qualified
8. When a labor organization has been chosen by a majority to represent the employees of a
particular employer, the employer and the union are obliged to negotiate with one another in good
faith. Any agreement reached is reflected in a collective bargaining agreement which is binding
on both parties. See ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW 386-87 (11th ed. 1991).
9. See ADA§ 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. II 1990).
10. See ADA §§ 101-107; §§ 221-230, 241-245; §§ 301-309; §§ 401-02, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-12117; §§ 12141-12150, §§ 12161-12165; §§ 12181-12189; 47 u.s.c. §§ 225, 152(b),
221, 611 (Supp. II 1990).
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individual with a disability because of the disability ... in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." 11 The three key concepts in the employment provisions are what constitutes a disability, who is a qualified individual with a disability, and what is discrimination.
Disability is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual."12 This definition is based on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and has been significantly litigated under that statute. 13 Major life activities are those activities that the average person can perform with little or
no difficulty, including walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning,
working, caring for oneself, and participating in community activities. 14
A qualified individual with a disability is one who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions" of
the job. 15 The essential functions of the job are determined by the
employer. Written job descriptions will be considered as evidence of the
essential functions. 16
The ADA details a number of actions constituting discrimination,
11. ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990).
12. ADA § 3(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (Supp. II 1990). The definition of disability
also includes "a record of such impairment", ADA § 3(2)(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(8) (Supp. II
1990), and "being regarded as having such an impairment". ADA § 3(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ l2102(2)(C) (Supp. II 1990). Thus, if a person has a history of disability but no longer is
disabled, he or she is protected from discrimination on the basis of that record. For example, an
employer cannot refuse to hire a cancer survivor whose cancer has been successfully treated.
Similarly, if an employer discriminates against an individual based on the belief that the individual
is disabled, the individual is protected even though not disabled. For example, an employer
cannot refuse to hire an individual whose back x-rays show arthritis, but who has no symptoms or
limitations as a result of the arthritis and therefore does not meet the statutory definition of
disability.
The statute expressly eliminates certain conditions from the definition of disability, including
homosexuality, bisexuality, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, current illegal drug
use, "transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairments or other sexual behavior disorders." ADA
§ 511, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(Supp.II1990).
13. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 21.
14. See 29 C.F.R. § l630.2(i) (1992). Inability to perform a particular job or a small number
of jobs is not sufficient to constitute a substantial limit on the major life activity of working.
15. ADA§ 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1990).
16. See id. Of course, if the employer's determination of essential functions is challenged in a
discrimination action, the court may decide that the designated functions are not essential. Other
evidence to be considered in determining essential functions includes the amount of time spent
performing the function, the work experience of incumbents in the job with respect to the
function, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and the consequences of not requiring
the incumbents to perform the functions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1992).
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which include intentional discrimination; 17 use of standards, criteria,
methods of administration, tests or selection criteria that have the effect
of discrimination; 18 and failure to reasonably accommodate a qualified
individual with a disability. 19 The statute also prohibits participation in
a contractual arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting
a qualified disabled employee or applicant to discrimination. 20 Retaliation against an individual for opposing unlawful actions or for participating in any proceeding under the ADA is expressly banned. 21
The three primary defenses to a claim of discrimination are business necessity, direct threat, and undue hardship. An employer22 may
justify the use of discriminatory job qualifications, selection criteria, or
tests by establishing that they are job related and consistent with business necessity. 23 The statute also permits an employer to use a qualification standard requiring that an individual not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of others in the workplace. 24 Finally, an employer may
refuse to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual if the accommodation would impose undue hardship on the employer's business. 25
Additionally, of course, an employer could defend a claim under the
ADA by proving that an individual was not disabled or not qualified for
the position, or that the individual was not discriminated against because
of the disability.
In addition to other prohibitions on discrimination, the ADA
directly limits the use of medical examinations. A medical examination
may be required of an applicant only after an offer of employment is
made. 26 The offer may be conditioned on the results of the examination
only if all new employees are subjected to the examination, the medical
information is kept confidential, and any disqualification resulting from
17. See H.R. REP. No. 485, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310.
18. See ADA§ 102(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1990); ADA§ 102(b)(6),
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990). These sections of the ADA codify the disparate impact
theory of discrimination.
19. ADA§ 102(b)(S), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (Supp. II 1990).
20. See ADA§ 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990). This provision expressly
incorporates a contract with a labor organization as one that cannot subject an individual to
discrimination.
21. See ADA § 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (Supp. II 1990). The statute further bars
coercion, intimidation, threats or interference with individuals exercising rights under the Act or
encouraging others to do so. ADA§ 503(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (Supp. II 1990).
22. The term employer is used in this discussion for simplicity, but the provisions apply to
covered entities which include, inter alia, labor organizations.
23. See ADA§ 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. II 1990). This defense is applicable to
disparate impact cases.
24. See ADA§ 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. II 1990).
25. See ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
26. See ADA § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (Supp. II 1990).
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the examination is based on criteria that are job-related and consistent
with business necessity. 27 An employer may inquire about an applicant's ability to perform the job, but not about the applicant's disability. 28 Required medical examinations for employees also must be jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. 29
The ADA's substantive provisions are patterned after the Rehabilitation Act and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. The legislative
history directs courts and covered entities to the Rehabilitation Act for
guidance in interpreting the ADA. 30 The enforcement and remedial provisions of the ADA track those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 31

III. THE ADA

AND

UNIONS

As noted previously, labor organizations are covered entities under
the ADA. 32 Yet unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, there are no
provisions in the ADA specifically proscribing or defining discrimination by labor unions. 33 Thus, the same nondiscrimination provisions
apply to the employer and the union. There are several specific references to unions and collective bargaining agreements in the statute and
the regulations. Section 102(b)(2) of the statute bars covered entities
from participating in a contractual arrangement or relationship with a
labor union that has the effect of subjecting an individual to
discrimination. 34
The regulations and interpretive guidance issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") address collective
bargaining agreements in two respects. First, the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement are one factor in the determination of whether a
particular function is an essential function of the job that a person with a
disability holds or desires. 35 Second, the terms of a collective bargain27. See ADA§ 102(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)
(1992).
28. See ADA § 102(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
29. See ADA § 102(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
30. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 25-27, 30, 31, 34; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II),
supra note 17, at 23, 50, 52, 54-55, 61-62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 304, 332, 334, 336-37,
343-44.
31. See ADA§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. II 1990); H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra
note 17, at 23, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
32. See ADA§ 101(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (Supp. II 1990). The term labor organization
has the same definition under the ADA as under Title VII. See ADA § 101(7), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111 (7) (Supp. II 1990). Under Title VII, the term is defined broadly enough to cover virtually
all labor organizations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (1988).
33. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(c) (1988).
34. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
35. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(v) (1992). The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual
notes, however, that mere listing in a collective bargaining agreement does not mc;:an that a
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ing agreement "may be relevant" to a determination of whether an
accommodation would be unduly disruptive to the employees or the
functioning of the business. 36
Also relevant to determining the applicability of the ADA in the
unionized workplace is Congress's suggestion, repeated in the EEOC's
Technical Assistance Manual,. that employers and unions can avoid conflicts between the ADA's requirements and the collective bargaining
agreement by negotiating a contract provision permitting the employer
to take all actions necessary to comply with the ADA. 37
These references from the statute, legislative history and regulations offer limited guidance regarding the applicability of the ADA in
the unionized workplace. Not only are there questions about the obligations of unions under the ADA, but there are also issues about compliance with potentially conflicting obligations under the ADA and the
NLRA. The following sections will analyze the application of the ADA
in the organized setting, utilizing not only the language and legislative
history of the statute, but also the regulations and the case law under the
·
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
A.

The Union as a Covered Entity

The inclusion of labor organizations in the definition of "covered
entities" under the statute suggests that unions are subject to the same
prohibitions on discrimination as employers. 38 Unquestionably, when
the union acts as an employer vis a vis its own employees, it will be
treated like any other employer under the statute. 39 When the union acts
function is essential. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Technical Assistance
Manual on Title I of ADA§ 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:6981, 7050 (1992).
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d), app. (1992). The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual
notes that where a collective bargaining agreement reserves particular jobs for individuals with a
certain amount of seniority, that "may be" a factor in determining whether it would be an undue
hardship to assign a disabled individual without such seniority to the job. See Technical
Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at § 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7050. The
regulations conform to suggestions in the legislative history. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at
32; H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 63.
37. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 17, at 63,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346; Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, §§ 3.9,
7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050.
38. See Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 3 DET. C.L. REv. 925, 960 (1991).
39. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 618 (2d ed. 1983) ("A union acts in the role of an employer with respect to persons it itself
employs, and, like any other employer is subject to liability under the employment discrimination
laws for discrimination against its employees or applicants for employment."). When a union is
sued as an employer, the union must meet the definition of employer under the statute, however.
See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 270
(2d ed. Five Year Cum. Supp. 1989) ..
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as a union, however, its obligations are less clear. The only mention of
unions in the section defining discrimination is the prohibition on participation in a contract with a union that subjects an employee or applicant
to discrimination. 40 Since a union does not contract with itself, the language suggests that only employers are covered by the prohibition.
Even if that provision applies only to employers, however, one could
argue that all other prohibitions on discrimination apply to employers
and unions alike.
Since the Rehabilitation Act does not cover unions, it provides little
direction for interpreting the ADA in this regard. Title VII provides
more assistance, but unlike the ADA contains prohibitions tailored to the
union's role in the workplace. 41 By way of contrast, the ADA prohibits
discrimination in regard to application procedures, hiring, promotion,
discharge, compensation, training, and "other terms, conditions and privileges of employment."42 These functions are generally performed by
the employer rather than the union, although the employer's actions may
be circumscribed by the collective bargaining agreement. 43 This language in the ADA provides further support for limiting many of the
discrimination provisions to employers. The EEOC, however, has taken
the position that the ADA imposes the same obligations on unions that it
imposes on employers. 44
In light of the clear definition of covered entity, and the express
application of the discrimination prohibitions to covered entities, the
40. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
41. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or to classify its membership or applicants for
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1988).
42. ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990).
43. The Supreme Court described the role of management in United Steelworkers of America
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). "Collective bargaining agreements
regulate or restrict the exercise of management functions; they do not oust management from the
performance of them. Management hires and fires, pays and promotes, supervises and plans. All
these are part of its function ...." Id. at 583. See also David Offen Simon, Note, Union Liability
Under Title VII for Employer Discrimination, 68 GEo. L.J. 959, 961 (1980).
44. In its Technical Assistance Manual, the EEOC states that labor unions are covered by the
ADA and have the same obligations as employers to comply with its requirements. Technical
Assistance Manual, supra note 35, §§ 3.9, 7.1 l(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050.
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more persuasive argument is that the ADA's discrimination prohibitions
apply equally to unions. This interpretation is consistent with the
ADA's goal of eliminating discrimination against the disabled. This
conclusion does not answer the question of what role the union must
play in the discrimination in order to be held liable. Does the existence
of a contract provision that results in discrimination impose liability on
the union? Or must the union take an active role in the conduct alleged
to be discriminatory? Furthermore, does the discrimination ban apply to
the union in its contract administration role? And finally, does the union
have an affirmative duty to contest discrimination by the employer?
B.

The Collective Bargaining Process

In order to analyze these questions, it is necessary to have an understanding of the collective bargaining process. Once employees have
chosen a union to represent them, the NLRA imposes upon their
employer a duty to bargain in good faith with the union. 45 This duty
requires the parties to meet and negotiate wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment, but does not require the parties to reach
agreement. 46 Each party has available certain economic weapons to
attempt to convince the other party to accept the contract provisions that
it desires. 47 The primary union weapon is the strike. 48 The employer,
however, may lock out the employees,49 permanently replace the
employees if they strike, 50 and implement the terms and conditions of
employment that it desires if the parties reach an impasse in negotiations. 51 The agreement reached, if any, is generally a function of the
relative economic power of the parties and the strength of their desire for
particular contract provisions. 52 The union's "desire" is not merely the
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1988).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970).
47. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'! Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
48. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1088 (Patrick Hardin et al., eds., 3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter "Hardin"].
49. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); Harter Equip. Inc., 280
N.L.R.B. 597 (1986), review denied sub nom. Local 825, IUOE v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir.
1987).
50. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). Employees engaged
in an unfair labor practice strike must be reinstated, even if the employer must discharge
permanent replacements to do so. See NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 227 F.2d 675, 676 (!st Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). Currently, legislation is pending that would bar
employers from permanently replacing strikers. The Workplace Fairness Act, Bill No. S. 55 was
reintroduced in the 103d Congress, 1st Session. 139 CONG. REc. Sl91 (daily ed. January 21,
1993). The bill has been named the Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act, and passed the House
on June 15, 1993. H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CoNG. REC. H3527 (daily ed. June 15,
1993).
51. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962).
52. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
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desire of the union as an entity, or its employees, but the desire of the
employees in the bargaining unit and their willingness to strike over
particular issues. 53 Each party may accept certain undesirable provisions in the contract in exchange for other provisions that are more
important or less costly to obtain. 54 There is significant pressure for the
parties to reach agreement because of the substantial cost of failing to do
so.55
Once agreement is reached, the parties generally accomplish
enforcement of the agreement through the internal mechanism of a
grievance and arbitration procedure. Virtually all collective bargaining
agreements contain such a procedure, whereby the union, on behalf of
affected employees, may challenge management actions as violative of
the agreement. 56 The procedure is usually controlled by the union 57 and
culminates in binding arbitration by a neutral party. 58 Exhaustion of the
grievance and arbitration procedure is required before an employee, or
the union, can file suit to enforce the contract. 59 The courts give great
deference to the resolution reached in the grievance and arbitration
procedure. 60
The foregoing brief description of the cQllective barga,ining process
as circumscribed by federal law illustrates that the collective bargaining
agreement is not the product of two willing parties reaching a voluntary
BARGAINING 431-34 (1976); see also BRUCE FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 180-81
(West 2d ed. 1983).
53. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 484.
54. See Simon, supra note 43, at 961.
55. See Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv.
999, 1004 (1955). The costs of failure to reach agreement may be even greater today than they
were in the 1950s. See 137 CoNo. REc. S701-03 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum); 137 CoNG. REc. H2073-75 (daily ed. March 22, 1991) (statement of Cong.
Owens); 137 CONG. REc. H5518-19 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (statement of Cong. Moakley), 137
CoNG. REC. H5528-35 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (statement of Cong. Ford) (citing to strikes
involving PATCO, the air traffic controllers union, Continental Air Lines, Phelps Dodge Copper
Co., International Paper Co. and Greyhound Bus Lines).
56. Each of 400 sample collective bargaining agreements surveyed by BNA contained
grievance and arbitration provisions. See Basic Patterns: Grievances and Arbitration, 2
Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:1 (Jan. 23, 1992).
57. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 541.
58. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 541-42.
59. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). Suits for enforcement
of the collective bargaining agreement are authorized by Section 301 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1988). See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449-50
(1957). Under limited circumstances-for example, where the union breached its duty of fair
representation-exhaustion of the grievance procedure is excused. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 184 (1967).
60. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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agreement that is mutually beneficial. This understanding is essential to
an analysis of the liability of the union under the ADA. Also important
is the extensive regulation of collective bargaining and union-management-employee relationships by the NLRA. This regulation has significant implications for the interpretation of the ADA in the union setting.
C.

The Union as a Discriminatory Actor

In some industries, the union's role extends beyond that of negotiator and administrator of the agreement with respect to certain aspects of
hiring and otherwise determining the terms and conditions of employment. For example, the union may operate a hiring hall through which
the employer obtains its employees. 61 The collective bargaining agreement may obligate the employer to obtain its employees through the
hiring hall exclusively, or may allow the employer to seek employees
from other sources as well. 62 Where the union operates a hiring hall that
furnishes the employer with employees, the union will be liable for
intentional discrimination against qualified applicants with disabilities in
referrals for employment. 63 The union also will be liable if the hiring
hall utilizes standards, tests, or criteria for referral that screen out individuals with disabilities, unless the union can establish their job-relatedness and business necessity. 64
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, unions have been held
liable for discrimination in hiring hall referrals. 65 On the other hand,
referral criteria based on experience have been held lawful even if discriminatory in effect, where they constitute a bona fide seniority sys61. Hiring halls are common in the construction and maritime industries, for example.
ScHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 619.
62. See Bullard v. Sercon Corp., 846 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) (nonexclusive hiring hall);
Boilermakers Local 374 v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1353, 135.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (exclusive hiring hall);
Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 127, 162 n.163 (1992) citing Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67, 71 n.l
(1989).
63. Regardless of the formality of the hiring hall arrangement, unions have been held liable
for discrimination in the operation of hiring halls under Title VII. MACK A. PLAYER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 429 (1988). Employers will also be liable for union
discrimination in hiring halls since discrimination under the ADA includes participating in a
contractual relationship that subjects the employer's applicants or employees to disability
discrimination. See ADA§ l02(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
64. See ADA § l02(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990).
65. See, e.g., Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 709 F.2d 807, 810 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Asbestos Workers. Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 131 (8th Cir. 1969); see also
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'! Union of Operating Engineers, 469 F. Supp. 329, 370 (E.D. Pa.
1978). affd without opinion, 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1981). rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (union liable under Section
1981 for discriminatory operation of hiring hall).
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tem. 66 These decisions are based on Section 703(h) of Title VII, which
allows use of a bona fide seniority system even if its effect is to lock
members of statutorily protected groups into inferior jobs held as a result
of previous discrimination. 67 The ADA has no comparable provision,
and it might be argued that the omission was intentional. As a result, it
is unclear whether seniority-based criteria that screen out individuals
with disabilities because they have been historically excluded will survive challenge under the ADA, absent proof of job-relatedness and business necessity. 68
Unions that discriminate in apprenticeship programs, or use admissions criteria that screen out the disabled and are unjustified by business
necessity or job relatedness, will also be liable under the ADA. 69 Similarly, the union will be liable under the ADA if it discriminates against
qualified disabled individuals with respect to membership and the discrimination adversely affects job opportunities or any other aspect of
terms and conditions of employment. 70 Although the ADA does not
expressly prohibit discrimination with respect to membership as does
Title VII, such discrimination would seem to come within the parameters of the ADA if it has an adverse impact on the individual's
employment. 71
66. See, e.g., Hameed v. Iron Workers Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 516 (8th Cir. 1980).
67. See Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349-50 (1977) (interpreting 42
u.s.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1988)).
68. See discussion infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text regarding the omission of a
provision comparable to § 703(h) from the ADA. In contrast to the history of intentional
discrimination by some unions based on race, gender or ethnicity, intentional discrimination by
unions against the disabled has been largely absent. It may, therefore, be more difficult to prove
that a system of seniority-based referrals perpetuates prior discrimination.
69. Apprenticeship programs are job training. See ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(Supp. II 1990). Cf Hameed v. Iron Workers Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1980) (union
liable under Title VII and Section 1981 for use of selection criteria for apprenticeship program
that had a disparate impact on African-Americans); Eldredge v. Carpenters Joint Apprenticeship
and Training Comm., 833 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1987) Goint labor-management committee
liable for system of providing apprentices with first jobs that had disparate impact on women).
70. A denial of membership might reduce an individual's chances for obtaining a job. For
example, under the NLRA a union may lawfully operate a hiring hall solely for members, so long
as it is not exclusive and all employers are allowed to hire from other sources. See Penzel
Construction Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 544 (1970), enfd, 449 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1971). If few
employers actually hire from other sources, however, lack of union membership may hinder an
individual's chances for employment. Also, priority of referrals may be lawfully based on
experience, seniority, or residency requirements that may be correlated with union membership.
See Hardin, supra note 48, at 1534-36 for a discussion of lawful referral preferences. But see
supra note 68 and accompanying text regarding the use of seniority-based referral preferences
under the ADA.
71. According to Section 102(b)(1 ), discrimination includes "limiting, segregating, or
classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status
of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee." ADA
§ 102(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(l) (Supp. II 1990).
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The Union as a Party to a Discriminatory Contract

In contrast to the situation that existed prior to 1964 with respect to
race and gender, collective bargaining agreements do not commonly
contain provisions expressly discriminating against qualified individuals
with disabilities. 72 An agreement might contain provisions that have the
effect of discrimination, however. For example, an agreement might
contain promotion criteria that adversely impact employees with disabilities. Assuming the establishment of the criteria's illegality, the
employer responsible for utilizing the criteria would be liable. If the
union played no direct role in implementing the promotional system, the
question of whether the union violated the ADA would tum on whether
liability would attach by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement
alone, or whether the union's role in negotiating the provision was
relevant.
There are two statutory provisions specifically addressing employment criteria. Section 102(b)( 6) prohibits the use of "qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria" that screen out
individuals with disabilities unless the criteria are job-related and consistent with business necessity. 73 Section 102(b)(7), requires that tests be
selected and administered to judge the skills that they purport to measure
and not any impairments of the test taker. 74 If neither the union nor the
collective bargaining agreement plays a role in the discriminatory conduct, it seems clear that the union would not be liable. For example, if
the agreement leaves test administration to the employer's discretion,
either explicitly or implicitly, and the test administration disadvantages a
disabled employee such that it does not reflect the employee's jobrelated skills, 75 then the employer should be solely liable. 76 If the agreement specifies use of a test or standard that unjustifiably77 screens out
72. See Player, supra note 63, at 430 and cases cited therein (unions liable for negotiating
contract with provisions expressly discriminating on the basis of race, gender, national origin or
religion).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (Supp. II 1990).
75. See ADA § 102(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7) (Supp. II 1990).
76. In an analogous situation under the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that the employer
was not liable for failure to accommodate where the type of work performed, the gang
assignments, and job assignments were determined by the union. See Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599
F. Supp. 731, 745 (D.R.I. 1984). Claims relating to testing might arise as claims for failure to
accommodate the disabled individual in the testing process. See infra notes 130-288 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the accommodation duty.
77. The effect is unjustifiable if the standard or criterion is not job-related and consistent with
business necessity. See ADA§ 102(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990). The burden
of establishing job-relatedness and business necessity is on the covered entity accused of
discrimination. See Evan J. Kemp, Jr. & Christopher G. Bell, A Labor Lawyer's Guide to the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 15 NovA L. REv. 31, 47 (1991) (Committee reports
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employees with disabilities; then there is a stronger argument for union
liability. 78 The question remains whether such liability attaches automatically by virtue of the union's agreement to the contract, or whether
the union's actions with respect to the particular provision or with
respect to disability discrimination in general, may absolve the union of
liability.
A review of case law under Title VII is useful for comparative analysis. There are two lines of cases dealing with the issue of union liability under Title VII for discrimination caused by the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement. One line of cases holds the union liable solely on the basis that it is a party to the collective bargaining agreement. In Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 79 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
union violated Title VII because the promotion system contained in the
collective bargaining agreement had a racially discriminatory impact on
the plaintiffs. The court rejected the union's argument that the employer
had sole responsibility for promotions, stating that the promotion system
"is contained in the collective bargaining agreement negotiated in 1967,
and, therefore, the Brotherhood as well as the railroad can be held liable
for its discriminatory impact." 80 The court's opinion merely quoted
Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 81 without further analysis. In Parson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
similarly held a union jointly liable for discrimination caused by the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. The court's brief
rationale noted that it would be "difficult" to impose liability for discrimination caused by an agreement on one party to the agreement and
not the other. 82 The court also pointed out that as representative of the
black employees, the union had a duty to protect them from invidious
treatment. 83
In Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, 84 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited this duty to protect the
indicate that the burden of proof is placed as it is in the regulations implementing Section 504,
which expressly require employers to justify challenged selection criteria).
78. The EEOC suggests that a collective bargaining agreement imposing physical
requirements that screen out qualified applicants with disabilities could be challenged as
discriminatory. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, § 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 405:7050.
79. 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982). The union, Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, was also a
defendant.
80. 678 F.2d at 1016.
81. 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978).
82. Id. at 1389.
83. Id.
84. 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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interests of employees disadvantaged by discrimination in reversing the
district court's dismissal of a Title VII action against a union co-defendant. The court described a union's duty as "broader than simply refusing
to sign overtly discriminatory agreements."B5 Albeit in dicta,B 6 the court
stated that where the union has not .negot~ated protection against discrimination for the employees and there is "solid evidence of employer
discrimination . . . , it would undermine Title VII' s attempt to impose
responsibility on both unions and employers to hold that union passivity
at the negotiating table in such circumstances cannot constitute a viola·
tion of the Act."B7
Even those cases that apply a lesser standard of liability effectively
impose on the union a duty to oppose discriminatory provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement. Some courts utilize an "efforts" test,
excusing the union from liability for contract provisions with discriminatory effects where it actively opposed the relevant provisions.BB
Under this test, the union must make all reasonable efforts to eliminate
the discriminatory provisions in order to avoid liability. B9
This duty appears to emanate from the union's duty of fair representation,90 a judicially created duty derived from the union's right to
exclusive representation under the NLRA. 91 The duty of fair representation requires the union to represent the interests of all employees in the
· 85. Id. at 989.
86. The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal on the basis of timeliness and
estoppel, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 985, 997.
87. Id. at 989. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied on this duty
to impose liability on a union for a discriminatory contract provision in Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir. 1976)..
88. See, e.g., Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 675 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1982); Terrell v.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Int') Molders & Allied Workers Union Local 342 v.
Terrell, 456 U.S. 968 (1982). The union's efforts may result in the conclusion that it did not
violate the statute, or in the imposition of injunctive relief only, with no liability for monetary
damages. See Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F. Supp. 1377, 1397-98 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 503 (E.D. Va. 1978), affdin part, rev'd in
part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
89. See Howard v. Int'I Molders & Allied Workers Local 100, 779 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th Cir.
1986) (union did not take every reasonable step to insure compliance with Title VII); Waker, 675
F.2d at 93 (the union made every reasonable effort to insure compliance, since the union's efforts
need not include a strike over the issue in order to be reasonable). In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (1971), however, the Fourth Circuit suggested otherwise. The court, in rejecting the
employer's defense that avoidance of union pressure was a legitimate business purpose justifying
the adverse racial impact of an employment practice, stated: "Title VII requires that union and
employer represent and protect the best interest of minority employees. Despite the fact that a
strike over a contract provision may impose economic costs, if a discriminatory contract provision
is acceded to the bargainee as well as the bargainor will be held liable." Id. at 799 (footnote
omitted).
90. Simon, supra note 43, at 969.
91. See id. at 963-64. The same duty is imposed by the Railway Labor Act. Id.
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bargaining unit without discrimination or arbitrary treatment. 92 Critics
of the imposition of such a duty under Title VII point out the differences
between Title VII and the NLRA, and further note that Title VII
expressly bars the union from causing or attempting to cause the
employer to discriminate. 93 This language does not suggest a duty on
the part of the union to prevent employer discrimination. 94 Accordingly,
the union should not be liable for discrimination caused by the collective
bargaining agreement unless a causal connection between the union's
actions and the discrimination exists. This approach considers the reality of the union's role in negotiations.
The contrary argument, for imposing liability where the contract
results in discrimination regardless of the union's role, posits that a strict
liability standard will force the union to oppose discriminatory provisions more stringently, even to the point of striking. 95 It is suggested
that such an approach will further Title VII' s goal of eliminating discrimination. 96 Advocates of this approach reconcile it with the causation
requirement in Title VII by arguing that the union binds the employer to
discriminate by acquiescing to a discriminatory contract, thus causing
discrimination. 97
Analysis of union liability under the ADA is not limited by language regarding causation of employer discrimination. The language of
the ADA differs from Title VII in that it imposes the same requirements
on unions and employers. Inclusion of the union as a covered entity
directly prohibited from using employment criteria with a disparate
impact supports liability based on agreement to a contract clause providing for use of discriminatory criteria. On the other hand, one might
argue that only the employer "uses" qualification standards or other
selection criteria when the employer administers the standards mandated
by the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, only the employer should
be liable when it applies the criteria and selects employees based on
whether the criteria are met. The statutory language and regulations
92. Id. at 964.
93. See id. at 971-72.
94. The Supreme Court's decision in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987),
casts doubt on the persuasive value of this argument to the courts. There the Court found the
union liable for race discrimination for refusing to file grievances alleging race discrimination,
despite the fact that there was no racial animus on the part of the union. Id. at 669. In addition,
the Court rejected the union's argument that the only basis for liability was § 703(c)(3) which
requires causation of employer discrimination. The Court based its finding of liability on
§ 703(c)(l) which bars the union from otherwise discriminating. Id. at 667.
95. See Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REv. 702, 704-07
(1980).
96. Id. at 706-07.
97. Id. at 705.
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arguably support limiting liability to the employer, for they make clear
that the imposition of liability on the covered entity is only for discrimination against the covered entity's own employees; a covered entity has
no liability for the actions of the other party to the contract towards its
employees. 98 Thus, the union would have no responsibility for discrimination against the employees of the employer resulting from the collective bargaining agreement.
Such an approach, however, ignores the role of the union in negotiating the contract provision that results in discrimination. Clearly the
employer cannot defend against its own liability on the basis that use of
the selection criteria is required by the collective bargaining agreement. 99 Yet the union still may be liable for a discriminatory contract
provision by virtue of its role as representative of the employees. 100
The union may have insisted that a discriminatory provision be
included in the agreement or acquiesced to the employer's insistence on
inclusion, either with indifference or after a struggle based on either the
union's opposition to inclusion or a desire to obtain a concession from
the employer in exchange for inclusion. In addition, the union's opposition to inclusion of the clause at issue may have been based on the discriminatory impact of the provision or upon some reason wholly
unrelated to discrimination.
Given the realities of the union's role in negotiating contracts, 101 it
seems intuitively correct that the union's liability should be determined
by its actions, rather than merely by its signature on the contract. The
union simply has no power to compel agreement to provisions that the
employees refuse to strike to obtain. 102 The only alternatives available
to the union are capitulation to the provisions or refusal to agree, leaving
all employees without the protection and benefits of the collectively bargained agreement. Nevertheless, the efforts test, properly applied, has
the virtue of encouraging unions to police agreements for provisions that
98. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6
(1992).
99. See ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
100. The issue of union liability should arise only when the individual files an EEOC charge
and subsequent lawsuit against the union. The Supreme Court held in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1981), that employers have no right to
contribution from unions that allegedly have partial responsibility for violations of Title VII.
Since the ADA contains no express right of contribution and the enforcement and remedial
provisions are patterned after Title VII, the same conclusion regarding the right to contribution
should obtain.
101. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
102. See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 503 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (union found guilty of discrimination based on
contract, but because the union was virtually powerless to alter the company's unilaterally
imposed policy, to which it acquiesced under protest, union not liable for back pay).
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might have a discriminatory impact, to place their negotiating strength
behind elimination of discrimination, and to attempt to convince their
membership to support the rights of the disabled. 103
The difficulty with a liability rule based on the union's efforts to
achieve nondiscrimination is in its application by the courts. The
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), despite its presumed expertise in labor relations issues, has problems evaluating the conduct of
parties in contract negotiations and determining whether they have bargained in good faith. 104 It may be equally difficult for courts to decide
whether a union's efforts in negotiations are sufficient to relieve it of
liability for a discriminatory contract provision. A rule imputing automatic liability would be far easier to apply.
There are several factors, however, that courts could use to assist
them in determining union responsibility for discriminatory contract
provisions. First, if the union actively sought or agreed without hesitation to a clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability, that
action should mitigate against union liability. 105 Second, if the union
proposed and supported nondiscriminatory selection criteria or actively
opposed discriminatory selection criteria, even short of a strike or major
economic concessions, such action supports the conclusion that the
union is not liable. 106 Third, union efforts to challenge discrimination
through the grievance procedure or through the administrative and judicial processes, particularly a challenge to contract language agreed to
under protest, would support the conclusion that the union's resistance
to discrimination was more than perfunctory. 107 Presence of each of
103. The rule advantages larger unions with sophisticated legal resources. Smaller, less
sophisticated unions may not anticipate potential disability issues and respond to them effectively.
104. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 481-84, and cases cited therein.
105. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (where the
union has not proposed nondiscrimination language and has remained silent in negotiations in the
face of strong evidence of employer discrimination, the union violates Title VII). Generally one
would not expect active employer opposition to confirming its nondiscrimination obligation under
the ADA in the collective bargaining agreement. See Hardin, supra note 48, at 901 ("Elimination
of invidious forms of discrimination in the bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of bargaining
and contract provisions prohibiting discrimination on invidious bases have become commonplace
in labor agreements." (citations omitted)). Employer opposition to such a clause might further
support imposing full liability on the employer for discrimination, while excusing the union from
responsibility.
106. Cf. Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 675 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1982) (union efforts to
negotiate changes in discriminatory practices relieve it of liability even though it refused to strike
over the issue); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1304, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(no union liability where union attempted to limit use of discriminatory tests in negotiations,
succeeding in part, filed grievances over the use of the tests and pursued them to arbitration, and
opposed the use of the tests in court).
107. See Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 503 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), where the court declined to assess back pay
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these three factors should relieve the union of liability. 108
Furthermore, the courts should use discretion to determine whether
it is appropriate to absolve the union of liability where the union's conduct indicates active opposition to discrimination although none of the
three factors are present. 109 There is significant pressure on the union to
achieve a collective bargaining agreement to protect employees. Not
only does failure to reach an agreement leave employees unprotected in
many ways, 110 but it leaves the union vulnerable to decertification. 111
Where a union capitulates to what turns out to be a discriminatory provision in order to reach an agreement, the union should not be held liable
unless its resistance to the provision was merely token. 112
against the union which had begun to "whittle away" at discriminatory practices "in a logical
progression," initiating "the only bona fide efforts to secure for women flight attendants the right
to continue working during pregnancy." Id. Efforts by the particular union in support of the ADA
might be considered as well. See Waker, 675 F.2d at 93-94 (union's active and persistent efforts
to increase job opportunities for black employees supports decision against liability); Dickerson,
472 F. Supp. at 1354 (union's opposition to discriminatory tests in court cases, including filing an
amicus brief in Griggs, supports conclusion that union is not liable).
108. This test for liability imposes on the union an arguably unjustified affirmative duty to seek
nondiscriminatory contract provisions, see Simon, supra note 43, at 981, but the inclusion of the
union as a covered entity subject to all the nondiscrimination provisions of the ADA supports such
a test.
109. For example, ·the union may agree to a provision regarding examinations that is later
revealed to have discriminatory effects. If the union either proposes a reasonable accommodation
that would eliminate the discriminatory effects, or grieves the employer's discriminatory
application of the provision, the union should be absolved of liability despite its initial agreement
to the contract provision with unanticipated discriminatory effects.
110. During negotiations, unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment are
unlawful even where they benefit the employees. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962).
Thus, the employees cannot receive any pay increases or additional benefits until either a contract
or an impasse is reached. Id. at 745. After an impasse, the employer can implement its last offer
to the union, which may increase or decrease pay and benefits. Id. at 745. If the contract is a first
contract, the employees will have no existing grievance and arbitration procedure with which to
challenge employer actions and no protection against unjust discipline. Even if an expired
contract contains such protections, the employer is not obligated to arbitrate many issues after
contract expiration, further eroding the employees' protection. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v.
NLRB, - U.S.-, lll S. Ct. 2215, 2224 (1991). A strike, of course, leaves the employees
vulnerable to permanent replacement. See supra note 50.
111. A petition for decertification; or certification of another union, can be filed during the
window period ninety to sixty days before expiration of a contract or after contract expiration if no
new agreement has been reached. See Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
In addition, a newly certified union has a one year period in which to reach agreement. After
expiration of the certification year, if no agreement has been reached, a petition for decertification
or certification of another union can be filed. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 97 (1954).
112. If the costs of failing to agree were not so high, and the sanctions for unlawful refusals to
bargain more effective, a different rule might be appropriate. Under current law, however, the
employer could obstruct agreement by insistence on contractual provisions that would have a
discriminatory impact on the disabled, with virtually no consequences under the NLRA. A charge
of bargaining in bad faith could take years to litigate and the only remedy is an order to bargain,
starting the process over again. Hardin, supra note 48, at 1844. In the meantime, the union would
be left with the choice of remaining without a contract, leaving the employees unprotected and the
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Of course, the court should give the union credit only for sincere
efforts to oppose discrimination. Courts can assess the genuineness of
the union's opposition to discrimination both by the importance that the
union places on nondiscriminatory contract provisions in negotiations 113
and by the nature of the discriminatory provision. Most of the cases
under Title VII imposing liability on the union based on the collective
bargaining agreement have involved seniority systems, contract provisions likely to have resulted from union demands. 114 When a testing or
other selection criterion is involved, it is more likely to have resulted
from employer demands. In such a case, the court should more reluctantly assess union liability, absent clear evidence of the union's role as
a discriminatory actor. As is the case under Title VII, 115 the courts in
these cases should determine whether the union's anti-discrimination
efforts warrant relief from liability, or merely relief from monetary
damages.
A final argument, unique to the ADA, that might support union
liability is that the union has a duty to accommodate employees or applicants with disabilities. 116 This duty arguably includes either modifying
a contract with discriminatory effects or waiving compliance with conunion vulnerable to decertification, or agreeing to a discriminatory provision that would impose
liability under the ADA. See Stephen I. Schlossberg & John Silard, The Need for A
Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1059 (1968) and Arnold
Ordman, The National Labor Relations Act: Current Developments, Proceedings of New York
University Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference on Labor 115, 126-28 (l 972) for discussions of the
delay and remedial problems under the NLRA. The statute has not been amended to deal with the
problems discussed since that time. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act
Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 397, 432-33 (1992).
There is unlikely to be collusion between the company and the union under the efforts test
because only the union escapes liability. Thus the company will not allow the union to orchestrate
a scenario where it appears to support nondiscrimination, but does so ineffectively. Such a
strategy would increase the employer's potential liability, while absolving the union.
113. Importance can be determined by the frequency of discussion, the length of time the
proposal remains on the table, and what the union is willing to give up to obtain the proposal. But
see Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An
Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEX. L. REv. 759, 782 (1992), for an argument that
neither party should be required to make concessions in negotiations to obtain compliance with
the ADA. The courts should take care not to require more on the part of the union than is
reasonable, because the union is limited by the desires of its membership. See I.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (''The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective
agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect
the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group."); Strick Corp., 241
N.L.R.B. 210, 220 (1979) (union did not breach its duty of fair representation by agreement which
favored interests of only group in a position to "impose economic restraints upon the Employer in
the event of impasse" and impaired interests of group that was not).
114. See Simon, supra note 43, at 984.
115. See supra note 88.
116. See discussion infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text regarding whether the union has
a duty of accommodation.
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tractual provisions that cause discrimination. 117 The duty to accommodate applies to "known" physical or mental limitations, however, so that
the duty to accommodate does not arise until the employee requests
accommodation or the union and employer otherwise become aware of
the need for accommodation. 118 Thus, even if the duty to accommodate
requires contract modification or waiver, the duty would not arise until
the union actually knew of the discrimination caused by the contractual
provision. Furthermore, if the union could establish undue hardship, no
accommodation would be required.11 9 Accordingly, the efforts test is
the most appropriate measure of union liability for contract provisions
with discriminatory effects.
E.

The Union as a Grievance Representative

A union's duty of fair representation arises not only in the context
of negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, but also in its
enforcement. 120 Under Title VII and section 1981,1 21 unions have been
held liable for discrimination in handling grievances. 122 Since access to
the grievance procedure is a term, condition or privilege of employment
which is controlled by the union, discriminatory refusal to pursue a
grievance based on the grievant's disability violates the ADA. 123 It is
not unusual for a contractual grievance to involve an issue relating to the
employee's disability. 124 For example, an employee's own physician
might release the employee to work after an illness or injury, while the
117. While neither contractual modification nor waiver is mentioned in the statutory list of
accommodations, the list is not exclusive. Moreover, the accommodations listed might well
require contract modification since job descriptions, work schedules, job assignments, and training
programs may be incorporated into collective bargaining agreements. See further discussion of
the issues posed by conflict between accommodations and the collective bargaining agreement
infra notes 138-288 and accompanying text.
118. ADA§ 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990); S. REP. No. 116, supra
note 2, at 34; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 17, at 65, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
347.
119. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990). See infra notes 134288 and accompanying text for more extensive discussion of the application of the
accommodation duty to unions and the circumstances under which liability would attach.
120. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race.
122. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (union violated Title VII
and § 1981 by failing to process grievances asserting racial discrimination.) Unions are frequently
accused of failing to pursue a grievance because of the race, gender or ethnicity of the grievant.
See Gorman, supra note 52, at 705-07 and cases cited therein.
123. See ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990).
124. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967) (suit for breach of contract against the
employer and breach of the duty of fair representation against the union based on dispute over the
discharge of an employee with high blood pressure for alleged inability to work). Disability
related issues under the collective bargaining agreement might also arise with respect to medical

588

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:567

employer's physician might find the employee unable to perform contractual duties. 125 If the employee grieved the employer's refusal of
reinstatement and the union decided not to pursue the grievance, the
employee might charge both the union and the employer with disability
discrimination.
If the court found that the employer discriminated against the
employee under the ADA, would the union also be liable for its decision
to drop the grievance? Based on analogy to Title VII, the employee
would have to show that the union engaged in intentional discrimination
based on the employee's disability. 126 If the union proffers evidence of
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, e.g., a belief that it
would not prevail on the merits, then the employee would have to establish that the reason was a pretext for discrimination. 127 In the absence of
statements indicating hostility toward the employee or other employees
with disabilities, or evidence that employees in similar circumstances
without disabilities were treated more favorably, proof of pretext would
be difficult. 128 If, however, the union fails to make efforts to remedy the
employer's disability discrimination that is prohibited by the collective
bargaining agreement, then the union may also be liable for disability
discrimination. 129 Most courts, however, would require a pattern of
such refusals to establish the requisite intentional discrimination.
Other issues relating to the duty. of fair representation are significantly intertwined with the duty of reasonable accommodation established by the ADA and will be discussed in the following section.
or dependent care leaves, discipline for absenteeism, light duty for injured employees, and
benefits such as health insurance and pensions.
125. See id. at 174.
126. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 39, at 629-30 and cases cited therein (complaints of
discrimination in grievance handling are based on disparate treatment theory and require proof of
intentional discrimination).
127. Loretta K. Haggard, Reasonable Accommodation of Individuals with Mental Disabilities
and Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders Under Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act,
43 WASH. U. J. URe. & CoN'!'EMP. L. 343, 351 (1993). As Haggard notes, however, at least one
court has held that the defendant has a burden of proof rather than production once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387
(10th Cir. 1981).
128. Alternatively, the employee might be able to establish disparate treatment between
disabilities. For example, an employee with a particularly feared disease, such as AIDS, or who is
even merely HIV+, might be treated less favorably than an employee with heart disease, thus
establishing disability discrimination.
129. Cf Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668 (1987) (union that declined to
pursue racial discrimination grievances against employer liable despite lack of animus and
otherwise nondiscriminatory treatment of African-Americans). If the union has no vehicle for
challenging disability discrimination under the collective bargaining agreement, it may be
absolved from this risk of liability. But failure to negotiate a nondiscrimination clause may
subject the union to a greater risk of· liability for discrimination caused by provisions of the
contract. See supra notes 72-119 and accompanying text.
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The Union and the Duty of Reasonable Accommodation

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the employment provisions
of the ADA is the duty of reasonable accommodation. 130 In passing the
ADA, Congress viewed the primary problem as one of barrier discrimination, discrimination based on indifference and thoughtlessness rather
than hostility. 131 Thus the ADA requires covered entities to make reasonable accommodations that will enable a disabled employee to work.
The statute contains a nonexclusive list of reasonable accommodations
which includes making facilities accessible, job restructuring, modifying
work schedules, reassignment to vacant positions, acquiring or modifying equipment, modifying tests and training programs, providing readers
and interpreters, or other similar accommodations. 132 An accommodation need not be made, however, if it would result in undue hardship "on
the operation of the business of the covered entity." 133
The inclusion of unions in the definition of "covered entity" suggests that the union, like the employer, has a duty of reasonable accommodation. Yet the language regarding undue hardship suggests that only
employers are covered, since unions do not operate businesses. The
EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual states that unions have an accommodation obligation, 134 but there is no reference to such an obligation in
the Regulations. 135 By analogy, Title VII also supports imposing a duty
to accommodate on the union. Title VII requires reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious observance or practice.136 Although
the statutory requirement refers only to employers, courts and the EEOC
have interpreted the law to mandate accommodation by unions as
well. 137 Given the incorporation of unions as covered entities in the
ADA and this interpretation of Title VII, the more persuasive argument
is that the accommodation obligation applies to unions.
The primary context in which the accommodation issue would arise
130. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 33, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349.
("Reasonable accommodation is a key requirement of the Rehabilitation Act and of this Act.")
131. Ervin, supra note 38, at 962.
132. See ADA§ 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. II 1990).
133. See ADA§ 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
134. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at§§ 3.9, 7.ll(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050.
135. In its Overview of the Regulations, the EEOC indicated the "collective bargaining
agreement matters" were so complex that they required extensive research and analysis and
further consideration. Accordingly, the Commission decided to leave such matters for "in depth"
discussion in "future Compliance Manual sections and policy guidances". 56 Fed. Reg. 35727
(July 26, 1991).
136. 42 u.s.c. § 7010) (1988).
137. See infra note 163 and cases cited therein; McDaniel v. Essex Int'I, Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 35
(6th Cir. 1982); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1981); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.2(d) (1992).
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for the union would be where one or more possible accommodations
would either conflict with the collective bargaining agreement or impact
terms and conditions of employment, thereby requiring negotiation with
the union. For example, a disabled employee might desire to transfer to
a vacant position with duties that the employee could perform, but might
have insufficient seniority to obtain the position under the collective bargaining agreement. Alternatively, an employee might request restructuring of a position, the duties of which are defined in a collective
bargaining agreement or fixed by past practice. 138
The regulations address the issue briefly, but provide no definitive
guidance, merely noting in the Appendix that the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement "may be relevant" to determining whether an
accommodation would be unduly disruptive to the employees or the
business. 139 Such disruption would constitute undue hardship which
eliminates the accommodation obligation. 140 The Technical Assistance
Manual takes a similar approach, and provides additional "advice" to
avoid the problem. 141 The Manual suggests that the employer should
consult with the union to work out an accommodation, and further
advises that to avoid continuing conflicts with the collective bargaining
agreement, "employers" should seek a contract clause permitting them
to take all action necessary to comply with the ADA. 142
Setting aside for the moment the EEOC's recommendations regarding avoidance of conflict, it is useful to look at cases applying the
accommodation obligations under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII in
the context of a conflicting collective bargaining agreement in order to
analyze the possible results under the ADA.
1.

THE REHABILITATION ACT CASES

As noted previously, the legislative history clearly indicates that the
138. A past practice can become a binding term and condition of employment even where it is
not expressly embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA
ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 437 (4th ed. 1985). Many other possible
accommodations that impact terms and conditions of employment are readily apparent. Having a
supervisor perform nonessential functions of a disabled employee's position might violate a
contractual prohibition on supervisors performing bargaining unit work. A disabled employee
might require breaks in excess of those specified in the agreement. An employee with a disability
might need medical leave in excess of that permitted by the agreement.
139. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d), app. (1992). Notably this section refers to proof by the
employer of undue hardship.
140. See ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
141. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at § 3.9, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
405:7007.
142. See id. This suggestion was also made by Congress. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2,
at 32; H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 346.
This recommendation is discussed infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
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ADA is patterned after the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations. Federal courts faced with Rehabilitation Act claims for accommodation of a
disabled employee that conflict with the requirements of a collective
bargaining agreement have uniformly held that such accommodation is
not required. 143 Shea v. Tisch 144 is a typical case. In Shea, the employee
argued that he should have been reassigned to a position that would be
143. The only decision to the contrary was made by a special panel certified by the Merit
Systems Protection Board, which deferred to the EEOC holding that the employer must consider
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, despite the contrary provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement. See Ignacio v. United States Postal Serv., 30 M.S.P.R. 471, 486-87 (Spec.
Pan. 1986). The courts considering the decision have not found it persuasive. See Carter v. Tisch,
822 F.2d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 1987) ('The position taken by the EEOC and deferred to by the
Special Panel in Ignacio has been firmly rejected by the courts which have considered it."
(citations omitted)).
In a later decision, Konieczko v. United States Postal Serv., 47 M.S.P.R. 509 (MSPB 1991),
the Merit Systems Protection Board cited three unpublished EEOC decisions holding that "where
an agency demonstrates that its nondiscriminatory collective bargaining agreement precludes it
from reassigning an individual with a handicap to another position, such evidence is sufficient to
establish that the reassignment would place an undue hardship on the agency." Id. at 514-15.
Noting that the holding was a departure from Ignacio, the Board deferred to the EEOC's position
because it was an interpretation of discrimination law which was not "so unreasonable as to
violate civil service law." Id. at 515. The Board went on to state that "[t]he Board's prior
decisions which held that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement cannot override the
agency's obligations under the Rehabilitation Act are modified consistent with this Opinion and
Order." Id. The Board held, however, that Konieczko was entitled to reassignment since it was·
not precluded by the collective bargaining agreement, which merely accorded a preference to
employees in another job classification. Id. at 515. The Board followed Konieczko in Podrazik v.
United States Postal Serv., 54 M.S.P.R. 380, 384 (M.S.P.B. 1992), holding that the employer
demonstrated undue hardship where the collective bargaining agreement precluded the
reassignment sought as an accommodation.
In a July 1993 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a
memorandum of understanding that was part of the collective bargaining agreement did not
preclude transferring an employee as an accommodation because the memorandum did not
prohibit transfers of employees with less than one year of seniority. See Buckingham v. United
States Postal Serv., No. 91-56236, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17225 (9th Cir. July 13, 1993). In
Buckingham, the agreement reserved one of every four positions for transfers with at least one
year of seniority. Id. at * 15. The agreement also expressly allowed EEO factors to be considered
in filling the positions and further permitted the transfer preference to be overridden "in the most
unusual of circumstances." Id. at *15, *16. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
conclusion that the transfer of Buckingham, who only had five months seniority, was not barred
by the agreement. Id. at * 17. The court distinguished the case from other cases under the
Rehabilitation Act because the transfer to accommodate Buckingham's disability "would not
'usurp the legitimate rights of other employees under a collective bargaining agreement.'" Id. at
*16 (quoting Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987)).
The EEOC recently promulgated a regulation under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act
requiring federal employers to reassign nonprobationary employees unable to perform the
essential functions of their existing positions to vacant positions in which they can perform the
essential functions, unless the employer can show undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g)
(1992). The regulation exempts the Postal Service from reassignment inconsistent with the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. See further discussion of this regulation infra note 179.
144. 870 F.2d 786 (!st Cir. 1989).
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closer to his home and require only weekday work. 145 The employer did
not dispute that his disability required such an assignment, but argued
that it could not provide the plaintiff with such a position because it
would violate the collective bargaining agreement's requirement that
jobs be awarded on the basis of seniority. 146 The court concluded that
the employer "was not required to accommodate plaintiff further by
placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights
of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement." 147 The
Fourth, 148 Sixth 149 and Tenth 15°Circuits, along with a number of district
courts, 151 have reached similar conclusions.
The cases so deciding do not contain extensive rationales. 152 Since
most cases simply reason that overriding the collective bargaining agreement would adversely impact the rights of other employees secured by
the agreement, it appears that the courts have concluded that the existence of a conflicting collective bargaining agreement renders the accommodation unreasonable or constitutes undue hardship. 153 A few cases
145. Id. at 789.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 790.
148. See Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-68 (4th Cir. 1987) (reassignment not required
accommodation unless it would be available under the employer's existing policies, and here, the
collective bargaining agreement barred reassignment to light duty for employees with less than
five years seniority). See also Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 92-9308, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16259 (2d Cir. July 2, 1993) (while employer not obligated to reassign disabled employee,
the employer "cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably
available under the employer's existing policies"). Id. at *22.
149. See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985) (even if
employee was a qualified disabled individual, he was not entitled to reassignment or job
restructuring which would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining
agreement).
150. See Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (where
collective bargaining agreement barred both job restructuring and reassignment to permanent light
duty position, employer's contractual obligations to union and employees provide legitimate
business reason for discharging employee who could not perform the job for which she was
hired).
151. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Postal Se..V., 675 F. Supp. 225, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1987);
Hurst v. United States Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259, 261 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623
F. Supp. 1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
152. See Kenneth Allen Greene, Burdens of Proving Handicap Discrimination Using Federal
Employment Discrimination Law: Rational Basis or Undue Burden, 3 DET. C.L. REv. 1053,
1089-1103 ( 1989) for a general criticism of the courts for failing to analyze cases under the
Rehabilitation Act adequately, and a specific critique of the analyses in the cases involving
collective bargaining agreements and accommodation.
153. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (!st Cir. 1989) (''To give plaintiff such a new
position would violate the collective bargaining rights of other employees ...."); Carter, 822
F.2d at 467 ("Reassigning Carter to permanent light duty, when he was not entitled to one of a
limited number of light duty positions, might have interfered with the rights of other employees
under the collective bargaining agreement."); Jasany, 155 F.2d at 1251-52 ("An employer cannot
be required to accommodate a handicapped employee by restructuring a job in a manner which
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contain additional analysis. In Hurst v. United States Postal Service, 154
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia not
only relied on the impact on other employees, but also held that Congress intended to incorporate in the Rehabilitation Act the protection for
bona fide seniority systems contained in Title VII. 155 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act, like Title VII, required that the rights under the seniority
system, which was not created with the intent to discriminate, prevail
over the right of reasonable accommodation. 156
In Bey v. Bolger, 157 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania found that ari accommodation that violated the
collective bargaining agreement would cause undue hardship for the
employer. The court analyzed the relevant provision of the collective
bargaining agreement, which restricted light duty assignments to
employees with five years of service, and found that it was reasonable
and substantially related to the legitimate government purpose of accommodating employees while maintaining a high level of efficiency at a
would usurp the legitimate rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement.");
Daubert, 733 F.2d at 1370 ("USPS's contractual obligations to its employees and their union
under the collective bargaining agreement clearly ~culates [sic] a legitimate business reason for
Daubert's discharge [for inability to perform the duties of her position due to her disability].");
Carty, 623 F. Supp. at 1189 (employer not required to reassign an employee as a reasonable
accommodation where it might violate the rights of other employees secured by a collective
bargaining agreement).
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently noted, the
concepts of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship merge at times and the distinction
between them may not be altogether clear. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
("As a general matter, a reasonable accommodation is one employing a method of accommodation
that is reasonable in the run of cases, whereas the undue hardship inquiry focuses on the hardships
imposed by the plaintiffs preferred accommodation in the context of the particular agency's
operations."). While the distinction may not be significant in many cases, it may be important in
cases involving allocation of the burdens of proof. See id.
154. 653 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
155. Id. at 262. Section 703(h) of Title VII states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2h (1988). In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
353 (1977), the Supreme Court held that it was not unlawful to utilize a seniority system that did
not have its genesis in discrimination, despite the fact that the system perpetuated pre-Act
discrimination.
In incorporating § 703(h) into the Rehabilitation Act, the court relied on Skillern v. Bolger,
725 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir. 1984), where the court read Title VII's provisions regarding conflicts with
veteran's preference laws into the Rehabilitation Act to further the intent of Congress. Id. at 1123.
156. Hurst v. United States Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
157. 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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reasonable cost. 158 According to this court's analysis, it is not merely
the existence of the conflict, but the legitimacy of the provision's purpose that is relevant. 159
In Davis v. United States Postal Service, 160 another Pennsylvania
district court used a somewhat different analysis to reach the same
result. The Davis court held that the statute did not require the employer
to reassign an employee as an accommodation unless the employer had a
policy of reassignment that was discriminatorily denied to the plaintiff.161 Since the collective bargaining agreement required the employer
to fill job vacancies by seniority, the employer was not required to reassign Davis to a position to which he was not entitled on the basis of
seniority. 162
2.

TITLE VII AND ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation cases under Title VII provide further useful information for analytical purposes. Title VIl's only accommodation requirement is for religious beliefs and practices. 163 The United States
Supreme Court addressed this provision in TWA v. Hardison. 164 The
employee in Hardison sought an accommodation permitting him to
refrain from working on the Sabbath, which was Saturday in his religion. 165 Hardison did not have sufficient seniority to avoid Saturday
work, and the union was unwilling to agree to any violation of the agree158. Id. at 927. The court noted that it was necessary for efficiency and productivity to limit
the number of light duty assignments. Id.
159. The Carter court, in stating that a duty to reassign would not defeat the requirements of a
collective bargaining agreement unless the agreement had the effect or intent of discrimination,
may have been suggesting a similar limitation. 822 F.2d at 469.
160. 675 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
161. Id. at 235. The court in Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (D. Md. 1985), also
noted the absence of a duty to reassign in finding that accommodation was not required.
162. Davis, 675 F. Supp. at 235. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
collective bargaining agreement prevailed over the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 235 n.9. The court
also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the employer's statutory affirmative action obligation
mandated reassignment. Id. at 235.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988). While Title VII expressly requires religious accommodation
only by the employer, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988), the courts have interpreted the statute to
require accommodation by unions as well. See, e.g., EEOC v. Caribe Hilton Int'I, 597 F. Supp.
1007, 1013 (D.P.R. 1984); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 884 (9th Cir.
1980); Bums v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 589 F.2d 403, 404 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). In assessing the union's liability, courts have found the union
liable for intentional actions that prevent or obstruct accommodation by the employer. See
Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 60 (1986);
Hardison v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
164. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
165. Id. at 68.
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ment' s seniority provisions. TWA declined to take unilateral action in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court found that the duty to accommodate did not require the
employer to take action inconsistent with the agreement, noting that "[i]t
would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable accommodation'
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference
of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights,
in order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others .... " 166
The Court further stated that section 703(h) of the statute, which affords
special protection for seniority systems, supported this conclusion. 167
The Court overruled the appellate court's conclusion that the seniority
system did not limit accommodation, stating that that ruling was "plainly
inconsistent" with section 703(h). 168 The Court in Hardison additionally
ruled that any greater than de minimis accommodation cost to the
employer constituted undue hardship, relieving the employer of the
accommodation obligation. 169
While it might be inferred from the language of the Court in Hardison that the existence of a valid 170 conflicting bargaining agreement
alone constitutes undue hardship, 171 the lower courts have not interpreted Hardison to so hold. Where the collective bargaining agreement
conflicts, however, and the conflicting provisions provide significant
rights to other employees that might be infringed by accommodation,
courts generally have excused both the union and the employer from
accommodation on grounds of undue hardship. 172 Where no significant
impact on the rights of other employees results, courts have required
accommodation in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 173
166. Id. at 81.
167. Id. at 81-82.
168. Id. at 82.
169. Id. at 84.
170. In order to be valid, the collective bargaining agreement must not be adopted with
discriminatory intent. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l)(c) (1988).
171. The Court stated: "We agree that neither a collective bargaining contract nor a seniority
system may be employed to violate the statute, but we do not believe that the duty to
accommodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement."
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79 (footnote omitted).
172. See, e.g.. Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981F.2d336, 338 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, - U.S.
- . 61 U.S.L.W. 3834 (1993); Dickson v. International Longshoremen's Union Local 40, 38 FEP
Cases (BNA) 1253, 1255 (D. Ore. 1985); EEOC v. Caribe Hilton Int'!, 597 F. Supp. 1007, 1010
(D.P.R. 1984); McDonald v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 35 FEP Cases (BNA) 1661, 1665-66
(N.D. Okla. 1984). Cf. Boomsma v. Greyhound Food Management, 639 F. Supp. 1448, 1454-55
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (employer not required to alter facially neutral scheduling system mandated by
collective bargaining agreement where such alteration would adversely affect other employees,
but employer violated Title VII by disciplining employee without determining whether voluntary
substitution was possible).
173. See, e.g.. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir.
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The cases finding a duty to accommodate despite a conflicting contract
have been primarily cases where the employee objects on religious
grounds to the contractual requirement of paying union dues. 174 The
courts have distinguished these cases from those denying accommodation, noting that where the objecting employee is required to make a
charitable contribution, no employee is denied express contractual rights
and all employees suffer the same economic loss. 175 The courts have
required evidence of deprivation of other employees' rights to find
undue hardship, rejecting as insufficient generalizations about adverse
impact on employee morale. 176
3.

ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA

If courts follow the analysis of the Rehabilitation Act cases, refusal
to accommodate in violation of a collective bargaining agreement will
be permissible, at least in situations that implicate contractual rights or
expectations of other employees. Given the Congressional emphasis on
the Rehabilitation Act's provisions, 177 one may advance a persuasive
argument that the same result should obtain under the ADA. Congress
clearly knew of both the statute and its judicial interpretations when it
enacted the ADA, and expressly contemplated that the Rehabilitation
Act would provide precedent for interpreting the "undue hardship" provision.178 The analysis of the Rehabilitation Act cases may be even
more persuasive in interpreting the ADA because they involved not only
a nondiscrimination obligation under Section 504, but also an affirmative action obligation under Section 501, which is absent from the
1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981); Burns v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
174. See supra cases cited at note 173.
175. See Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d at 1243; McDaniel v. Essex Int'I, Inc., 696
F.2d 34, 38 (6th Cir. 1982). A more cynical view would suggest that the courts are interested in
protecting the rights of employees and employers, but not of unions.
176. See EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978)) (proof of coworkers'
unhappiness with accommodation is not undue hardship); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair
Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Anderson, 442 U.S. 921 (1979) (general sentiment in opposition to free riders, and
proof that other employees would grumble about accommodation that allowed employee to pay
union dues to charity not sufficient to establish undue hardship). Cf Lambert v. Condor Mfg.,
Inc., 768 F. Supp. 600, 604 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (court denied summary judgment, finding triable
issue of fact regarding impact on morale of employees that would result from requested
accommodation.).
177. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349
(interpreting undue hardship consistently with regulations under Sections 501 and 504); S. REP.
No. 116, supra note 2, at 36 (same).
178. See supra note 177.
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ADA. 179 On the other side of the argument, however, the legislative
history does not cite to any of the cases dealing with accommodation in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement, and many of the references to the Rehabilitation Act's precedential value cite only the regulations, which formed the basis for mu~h of the language of the ADA but
do not address the issue of accommodation and collective bargaining
agreements. 180
Cases under the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII
further support interpreting the ADA to allow refusal to accommodate in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement. 181 In addition, the legis179. See Greene, supra note 152, at 1060-62 for a description of the obligations of federal
employers under Sections 501 and 504. Greene suggests that the affirmative action obligations
under Section 501 support imposing upon federal employers both more stringent burdens of proof
and a higher standard for reasonable accommodation. Id. at 1064-65, 1092, 1096-99. Cf Jeffrey
0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation
and Undue Hardship in the Americans With Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1436-41
(1991) (arguing that reasonable accommodation requirements under Sections 501 and 504 are
virtually identical). Cases regarding accommodation and collective bargaining agreements do not
appear to distinguish between Sections 501 and 504. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st
Cir. 1989) (no reference to section); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987) (Section 504);
Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (Sections 501and504); Bey
v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D..Pa. 1982) (Sections 501 and 504), The EEOC, however, has
distinguished between the require.~ents of Sections 5Cll and. 504, and has recently issued a
regulation pursuant to Section 501. This new regulation requires federal employers to reassign
disabled employees to vacant positions when they are unable to perform the essential functions of
their jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g) (effective October l, 1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 12637 (April
10, 1992). The EEOC rejected arguments that the regulation was inconsistent with existing case
law which held that reassignment was not a required accommodation. The EEOC further noted
that the case Jaw frequently involved reasonable accommodation under Section 504, but not
Section 501, and in any event was based, in part, on EEOC regulations. See 57 Fed. Reg. 12637
(1992). Notably, the new regulation's reassignment requirement exempts the postal service from
reassignment when it would conflict with a collective bargaining agreement. 57 Fed. Reg. 12638
(1992).
180. See supra note 177; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 10, 25, 31, 32, 36; H.R. REP. No.
485(11), supra note 17, at 23, 54, 55, 61, 63, 64-65, 67, 70, 71, 72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 304, 336, 37, 343, 345, 346-47, 349, 352, 353, 354. But see S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at
31, 62.
181. See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text. The union dues cases do not require a
different conclusion since they rest on the distinction that there is no interference with the rights of
other employees. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text. As indicated by the legislative
history of the ADA, Congress did not intend the interpretation of undue hardship enunciated in
TWA v. Hardison to apply to the ADA. Both the House and Senate reports suggest that the ADA
rejects the Hardison Court's definition of undue hardship as anything more than a de minimis cost
on the employer. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 350; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 36; Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, The
Americans with Disabilities Act, Vol. 1, at 480 (Committee Print 1990) [hereinafter "Legislative
History"]. The portion of the holding relying on the conflicting provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement should still be persuasive in interpreting the ADA, however, particularly
because both the House and Senate Reports state that a collective bargaining agreement is relevant
to the determination of the reasonableness of an accommodation. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11),
supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at
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lative history of the ADA unequivocally states that an employer is not
required to "bump" an employee from a job in order to create a vacancy
for reassignment of a disabled individual. 182 This language suggests that
an employee entitled to a vacancy under the seniority provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement should not be "bumped" from the entitlement in order to accommodate a disabled employee. 183 With respect
to reassignment issues, one can argue that a disabled individual does not
qualify for a position if he or she does not have the requisite seniority to
obtain the position under the collective bargaining agreement. 184
As additional support for the argument that accommodation in violation of a collective bargaining agreement is not required, "it may be a
defense to a charge of discrimination that another Federal law or regulation prohibits an action (including the provision of a particular reasonable accommodation) that would otherwise be required by this part." 185
This section of the regulations could excuse accommodation that conflicts with a collective bargaining agreement, since section 301 of the
NLRA requires compliance with such agreements. 186
Yet support for a different interpretation of the ADA exists as well.
Both Congress and the EEOC suggest that a conflicting collective bargaining agreement is merely relevant to the determination of undue
hardship.1 87 While it might be argued that this simply provides the flex32. Nevertheless, the statement by both houses of Congress that "[t]he Committee wishes to make
it clear that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in 7WA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977), are not applicable to this legislation" may be viewed as supporting a general rejection of
Hardison. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 68, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
350; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 36.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
345; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32.
183. Joyce E. Margulies, Practical Considerations Regarding the Collective Bargaining
Relationship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 49 (Practicing Law Institute, 1990). Another way of phrasing
this argument is that a position is not vacant if another employee is entitled to the position under a
seniority agreement. See Jules L. Smith, Accommodating the Americans with Disabilities Act to
Collective Bargaining Obligations Under the NLRA, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 273, 282 (1992).
184. See Bales, supra note 2, at 185. Such an argument prevails only when use of seniority as
a criterion is lawful under the disparate impact provisions of the statute. Id. at 186.
185. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1992).
186. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450 (1957).
The comments to both the regulation and the section of the House Report cited therein, however,
refer to medical standards and safety requirements, a category of laws which does not apply to the
NLRA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e), app. (1992) (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at
74, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356). Accordingly, a court may not interpret this section
to provide a defense based on compliance with the NLRA.
187. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text; H.R. Rep. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at
63; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32. The statute itself enumerates certain factors to consider
in determining undue hardship, but does not list as a factor the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement. ADA § 101(10)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 121 ll(lO)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
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ibility to deny undue hardship where no other employees' rights are
affected, the Senate Report specifically cites the seniority versus disability conflict in job assignment as an example of a situation where the
collective bargaining agreement "may be considered as a factor" in
determining whether to require an accommodation. 188 Similarly, the
EEOC suggests that it may be an undue hardship to reassign a disabled
employee to a position to which another employee is entitled on the
basis of the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 189 The EEOC further suggests that since the employer and the
union have a duty to provide reasonable accommodation, they should
work together to reach an acceptable accommodation. 190 These statements by Congress and the EEOC suggest that a conflicting collective
bargaining agreement is not a complete defense.
The differing provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
further support the argument that the accommodation obligation in the
two acts differs. Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA lists reassignment as a specific required accommodation. 191 Most of the Rehabilitation Act cases declining to require accommodation in violation of a
collective bargaining agreement involved reassignment. 192 The inclusion of reassignment as an ADA accommodation might indicate Congressional intent to require reassignment despite any agreement. 193
While the absence of a statutory reassignment requirement under the
Rehabilitation Act played a role in some judicial decisions denying
accommodations in conflict with collective bargaining agreements, 194
188. See Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers
and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 229, 251 (1990) (citing S. REP. No. 116, IOlst
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1989)). The House Report suggests a similar position and further states that
the collective bargaining agreement is not determinative. See Legislative History, supra note 181,
at 336.
189. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at § 3.9, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
405:7007.
190. Id.
191. See ADA § 101(9)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b) (Supp. II 1990).
192. See cases cited supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
193. When one statute is based on another's provisions, principles of statutory interpretation
suggest that, where the language differs, Congress intended a different interpretation. See
National Labor Relations Board v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 1195, 1199 (6th Cir.
1987).
194. The EEOC has revised its regulations under Section 501 and now requires reassignment
for disabled employees under certain circumstances as a part of the federal employer's affirmative
action obligations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g) (1992). Interestingly, however, the EEOC
exempted the postal service from the requirement where reassignment would conflict with any
applicable collective bargaining agreement. Id. The EEOC reasoned that postal service
employees, whose collective bargaining rights are governed by the National Labor Relations Act,
have legitimate expectations based on seniority, while other federal employees, whose rights are
governed by the Civil Service Reform Act, do not. See 51 Fed. Reg. 12638 (1992). This rationale
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most of the decisions did not consider this a determinative factor. 195
Indeed, several courts reached the same result where the collective bargaining agreement prohibited job restructuring. 196 Others suggested that
the decision would be the same even if the statute specified reassignment as ra permissible accommodation. 197
The ADA contains an additional statutory difference: it renders
unlawful participation in a contractual arrangement that causes discrimination.198 The ADA's legislative history confirms Congressional intent
to bar the employer from using a collective bargaining agreement to
avoid the discrimination prohibitions. 199 This provision does not establish Congress's intent that the accommodation obligation prevail over a
conflicting collective bargaining agreement, however. Congress
modeled the statutory provision after the Rehabilitation Act regulations200 and, as noted, courts have uniformly construed the Rehabilitation Act as not requiring accommodation in conflict with a collective
bargaining agreement. 201
A further argument based on the statutory distinction between the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is that the Rehabilitation Act does not
cover unions, while the ADA imposes an accommodation obligation on
supports enforcing the legitimate expectations of private employees also governed by the NLRA
by denying accommodations that conflict with seniority rights.
195. See supra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Jasany v. United States ·Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985);
Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1369 (10th Cir. 1984).
197. See, e.g., Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 1987) ("even were there a duty to
reassign in some cases, such a duty would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of
discrimination"); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989) (favorably citing the rationale
of the Carter court).
198. See ADA§ 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supplement II 1990).
199. See Smith, supra note 183, at 279 (citing Legislative History, supra note 181, at 130);
Legislative History, supra note 181, at 336.
200. See Legislative History, supra note 181, at 336 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.ll(c)). See also 28
C.F.R. § 41.52(d) (1978) (revised, 1992) (Department of Justice Guidelines for federal agencies
implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); 29 C.F.R. § 32.12(a)(3) (1980) (Department
of Labor Regulations); 34 C.F.R. § 104.l l(a)(4) (1980) (Department of Education Regulations).
The Department of Human Services promulgated the regulation cited by Congress. The
Department of Justice now has responsibility for coordinating programs subject to Section 504
and has adopted the same regulation cited above. See Greene, supra note 152, at 1061 n.27.
201. See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text. The force of this argument may be
somewhat diluted by the fact that the language is not contained in the EEOC regulations
governing federal agencies because all of the cases arose in federal agencies. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.701 et seq. [superseded]. The EEOC regulations were, however, promulgated pursuant to
Section 501, 29 U.S.C. § 791. Id. Federal employees are also covered by Section 504
regulations, which do contain the cited language. See supra note 200. See supra note 179 for a
discussion of the relevant Rehabilitation Act cases and the statutory sections cited therein.
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the union as well as the employer. 202 By enacting a union accommodation obligation, Congress may have intended to eliminate the virtual
automatic invocation of conflicting collective bargaining agreements as
undue hardship. The legislative history does not suggest that such a
consideration, rather than a general desire to promote employment of,
and eliminate discrimination against, individuals with disabilities, motivated Congress to include labor organizations as covered entities, however. The presence of both parties to a collective bargaining agreement
as defendants in a lawsuit under the ADA may facilitate the fashioning
of relief that requires overriding the agreement. 203 In cases under the
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII, however, courts have not articulated
the absence of the union as a defendant, or in the case of the Rehabilitation Act, the absence of a cause of action against the union, as a reason
for holding that the collective bargaining agreement relieved the accommodation obligation. Instead, the courts focused on the expectations of
other employees created by the agreement. These same expectations
exist in ADA cases, raising ~e same issue, which argues for the same
solution-a holding that the collective bargaining agreement prevails.
The Supreme Court in Hardison cited Title VII' s exemption for
bona fide seniority systems, Section 703(h), 204 to support the conclusion
that the seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement
should prevail over the requested religious accommodation. 205 The
ADA contains no such protection for seniority systems. The absence of
such language may suggest a Congressional intent that accommodation
obligations prevail under the ADA. 206 While Section 703(h) was cited
as support for the Court's conclusion in Hardison, 207 a close reading of
the opinion indicates that the rights of other employees, which were created in part by the collective bargaining agreement, were the linchpin of
202. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text for discussion on the issue of whether the
ADA requires unions to accommodate disabled employees.
203. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983): There,
the Supreme Court required the employer to comply with an arbitration award despite its claim
that it was required to violate the contract by a conciliation agreement under Title VII. The
employer had entered into a conciliation agreement under Title VII that conflicted with its
obligations under the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. According to
the Court, the employer and the EEOC could not alter the collective bargaining agreement without
the consent of the union, which was not a party to the conciliation agreement. Id. at 770.
204. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
205. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977). The special
protection for seniority systems has provided a defense in other Title VII cases as well. See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977) (seniority system that
perpetuates pre-Act discrimination is not unlawful unless it had its roots in discriminatory intent).
206. See Ervin, supra note 38, at 960-62.
207. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81 ("Our conclusion is supported by the fact that seniority systems
are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself.").
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the holding. 208 Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act cases reach the same
result despite the absence of special statutory protection of seniority systems. 209 Thus, the omission of such statutory protection is not dispositive of the issue.
A final argument in support of according precedence to accommodation rights over conflicting collective bargaining agreements is based
on Section 501 of the ADA, which states:
(a) ... Except as otherwise provided in this Act, nothing in this Act
shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C.
790, et. seq.) or the regulations issued by federal agencies pursuant to
such title.
(b) Relationship with other laws. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of
any federal law or law of any state or political subdivision of any
state or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the
208. See id.; supra notes 164-76 and accompanying text. Hardison can be distinguished in that
it relied, in part, on the religious rights of the majority that are protected by Title VII. Hardison,
432 U.S. at 81. The ADA does not protect the rights of the able. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)("No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability ...."). See Eric
H.J. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate
under the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation, 9 LAB. LAW. 71, 89 n.167
(1993). Hardison also relied on the contractual rights of other employees, however, regardless of
whether the employees' exercise of those rights was based on religious practices. Hardison, 432
U.S. at 64. Furthermore, while the able are not protected by the ADA, Congress expressly
disclaimed any intent to prefer disabled employees over equally qualified able employees. See H.
REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 55, 56, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337, 338. A more senior
employee entitled to a position under the collective bargaining agreement is arguably more
qualified for the position than a disabled employee, and the employer would be entitled to accord
the more senior employee the position as required by the agreement. As noted supra, the
Rehabilitation Act cases find that a federal sector employer need not accommodate a disabled
employee where such an accommodation conflicts with the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement, despite the fact that the statute does not protect the rights of the able and mandates
affirmative action. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (!st Cir. 1989) (Postal Service not
required to accommodate disabled employee where reassigning him as requested would violate
the collective bargaining rights of other employees). The Rehabilitation Act requires the Postal
Service to engage in affirmative action for hiring, placement and advancement of disabled
individuals. See 29 U.S.C. § 79l(b) (1988).
The Hardison decision also may have been influenced by a concern for the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. While the religious accommodation requirement of Section 701 (j)
has been upheld as constitutional by several courts, see, e.g., EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849
F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1246
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981), the Supreme Court, after Hardison, struck down as
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute requiring employers to allow employees to refuse to work
on their Sabbath. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). Justice
O'Connor's concurrence distinguished the statute from Section 70l(j) on the basis that 70l(j)
required reasonable rather than absolute accommodation. Id. at 711.
209. Indeed, at least one case reads§ 703(h) into the Rehabilitation Act. See Hurst v. United
States Postal Service, 653 F. Supp. 259, 262-63 (N.D. Ga. 1986). See discussion of Hurst supra
notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
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rights of individuals with disabilities than afforded in this Act. 210

The argument that Congress intended this Section to preempt the NLRA
and agreements negotiated pursuant thereto is without merit, however. 211
The ADA's statutory language and legislative history clearly indicate
the intent to coordinate the ADA with other statutes protecting individuals with disabilities, insuring that the ADA does not reduce existing protections against discrimination. 212 Interpreting the ADA to permit
findings of undue hardship based on conflicts with collective bargaining
agreements would be consistent with Section 501 since it would apply
the standard of protection applied under the Rehabilitation Act. 213
4.

PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE ADA
ACCOMMODATION OBLIGATION

The uncertainty regarding accommodation in the face of a conflicting collective bargaining agreement creates difficulty for unions and
employers deciding how to proceed in the face of accommodation
requests. The EEOC suggests that when an employee initiates a request
for accommodation, the employer and employee should seek a joint
determination of the appropriate accommodation. 214 Problems immediately surface for both the union and the employer, however. The NLRA
prohibits bargaining with an individual employee about terms and conditions of employment where a union represents employees. 215 Thus, the
employer is faced with conflicting obligations of two statutes. Including
the union in the accommodation process might resolve the problem with
individual bargaining, but the confidentiality provisions of the ADA
may prohibit the employer from sharing with the union information
about the employee's disability. 216 Unless the employee chooses to disclose such information,217 a joint decision on accommodation by all
210. ADA § 501, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (Supp. II 1990).
211. See Smith, supra note 183, at 280.
212. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 1, IO!st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) at 44, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 288-89).
213. See supra notes 143-62 and 177-80 and accompanying text.
214. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(3) (1992). This regulation is based on the legislative history.
See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 65-66, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 347-48;
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 34.
215. See, e.g., Allied-Signal Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 118 (1992); White-Evans Serv. Co., 285
N.L.R.B. 81 (1987); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). See also Wood v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
216. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(c)(3)(B), 12112(c)(4)(C) (Supp. II 1990); James G. Frierson, An
Employer's Dilemma: The ADA 's Provisions on Reasonable Accommodation and Confidentiality,
43 LAB. L.J. 308 (1992) (discussing the problems that the confidentiality provisions create in·
accommodating the disabled employee). For more extensive discussion of the confidentiality
requirements see infra notes 248-67 and accompanying text.
217. Even a suggestion by the employer to the employee that an accommodation would be
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three parties might be impossible.
Further, the employer would violate the NLRA if it unilaterally
changed the collective bargaining agreement to accommodate the
employee. 218 In addition, if the accommodation required violation of the
contract, the employer's breach would be subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedure and ultimately to a suit for enforcement under Section 301. 219 Moreover, the confidentiality provisions of the ADA may
directly conflict with the NLRA, which requires the employer to furnish
to the union ·information that is relevant and necessary to the union's
representational duties. 220 Thus, compliance with the ADA may subject
the employer to charges for violating the NLRA and vice versa.
The union is equally on the horns of a dilemma. Under the NLRA,
the union has no duty to bargain about or agree to any midterm modification of a collective bargaining agreement. 221 Indeed, if it does so, it is
impossible unless information about the disability is revealed to the union might be unlawful
under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Supp. II 1990) ("It shall be unlawful to coerce,
intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, . . . any right
granted or protected by this Chapter."). The union has a duty to represent the employee as a
member of the bargaining unit, however, and the confidentiality provisions do not prevent
voluntary disclosure by the employee to the union.
218. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 1039,
1041 (1987). While the NLRA would allow a unilateral change if the contract violated the ADA,
it is likely that most provisions at issue in accommodation cases will be neutral provisions that
conflict with a specific requested accommodation rather than unlawful contract provisions. See
Standard Candy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1073 (1964) (employer did not violate the NLRA by
unilaterally raising wage rates to comply with new minimum wages established by the Fair Labor
Standards Act, but did violate the NLRA by unilaterally granting pay increases above the required
minimum wage.); see also EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 364 F. Supp. 1105, 1129 (E.D. Pa.
1973). The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum to Field Personnel on Potential Conflicts
Raised by Americans With Disabilities Act concludes that "it seems unlikely that an employer
would be privileged to unilaterally change working conditions to achieve compliance with the
ADA without giving a union any notice or opportunity to bargain." Memorandum GC-9 (August
7, 1992), 158 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-15 (August 14, 1992) [hereinafter General Counsel's
Memorandum].
219. See Hardin, supra note 48, at 1419.
220. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial, 385 U.S.
432, 435-36 (1967). The need for confidentiality may provide a defense for a refusal to provide
information, but the need for the information is balanced against the need for confidentiality to
determine whether the employer's refusal is lawful. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S.
301, 314-15 (1982); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 27, 32 (1982), enfd, 711 F.2d
348 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 218, at D. Recently,
the General Counsel of the NLRB issued a complaint against an employer which ceased its prior
practice of providing the union with copies of call-in logs that indicated absences from work,
including sick leave. See NLRB Charges Stemming from Conflicts with ADA Remain Low, Hunter
Reports, 150 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) d15 (Aug. 6, 1993). The General Counsel rejected the
employer's argument that the logs were protected by the confidentiality provisions of the ADA.
Id.
221. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). If the contract provision is unlawful under the ADA,
however, the union may be engaged in unlawful discrimination by refusing to agree to a change.
See NLRB General Counsel Jerry M. Hunter's Speech on Relationship Between Americans With
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subject to challenge for breach of the duty of fair representation by
employees who object to the change. 222 While the union will not be
liable unless it acts arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad faith, 223 such a
lawsuit is costly to defend and the standards for liability are sufficiently
flexible to pose a risk for the union. 224
A request for accommodation that requires waiver of a provision of
the collective bargaining agreement raises similar issues. 225 If the union
agrees, any employee disadvantaged by the agreement may file a grievance for breach of the contract. A charge for breach of duty of fair
representation may follow if the union fails to pursue the grievance. 226
The problem is exacerbated if the union is unable to explain its actions
because of the ADA's confidentiality provisions. 227 The union's agreement to a contract breach that violates the rights of able employees without sufficient information to establish that it is required by the.ADA may
be challenged as arbitrary. 228
While compliance with the ADA may provide a defense to a fair
representation action, the case law suggests that the union has a duty to
investigate and act on facts, not mere representations by the employer
that the particular accommodation is necessary. 229 For ex;nnple, under
Disabilities Act and National Labor Relations Act Delivered at American Bar Association
Meeting, San Francisco, Aug. JJ, 1992, 158 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D·l, D-2 (August 14, 1992)
[hereinafter Hunter Speech] ("A party would have no right under the NLRA to insist on adherence
to contract terms that are, on their face, violative of the ADA.").
222. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int') v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991).
223. Id. at 1130.
224. See Carter v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 789, 963 F.2d 1078, 1082-83
(8th Cir. 1992) (although contract fell within wide range of reasonableness, summary judgment
for union reversed where allegations of plaintiffs regarding l) provisions of contract, 2) union's
conduct during negotiations which failed to protect predominantly female wrapper jobs, and 3)
biased remarks by union officials and male meat cutters evidenced discrimination against women
in contract negotiations).
225. An example of such a request would be a waiver of seniority to allow a less senior
disabled employee to take a job to which another employee would be entitled under the
agreement, or a restructuring of a job which assigned some marginal tasks to a different
contractual job classification.
226. A charge for breach of the duty of fair representation may result in an unfair labor
practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181, 186 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The availability of
an unfair labor practice remedy does not preclude the aggrieved employee from bringing suit in
federal court for breach of contractual rights by the employer and breach of the duty of fair
representation by the union. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1967).
227. Employees without a rational explanation for the union's refusal to pursue a grievance are
more likely to file an action for breach of the duty of fair representation. The union's reliance on
confidentiality may be viewed by the employee as a cover-up for an unlawful motive.
228. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 193 (a union breaches its duty of fair representation if its
conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith). For a discussion of the varying standards
applied by lower courts using the Vaca standards, see Malin, supra note 62, at 136-44.
229. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 559, 559 n.4 (1976) (court of
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the ADA, reassignment generally is not required unless no other accommodation is possible. 230 To preserve any defense based on the ADA in a
possible duty of fair representation action, the union should insure that
no other accommodation is possible before agreeing to violate the contractual rights of other employees. If the employer adheres to the confidentiality provisions of the ADA, however, such a precaution may be
impossible. The union can seek to obtain the necessary information
through the NLRA's unfair labor practice provisions. 231 The legal procedures required to do so, however, may significantly delay agreement
to the requested accommodation, creating a further dilemma for the
employer needing to effectuate an accommodation but reluctant to tum
over confidential information in violation of the ADA. Furthermore, the
union has an incentive to decline to agree to an accommodation without
information about the disability, for it has a duty to accommodate only
known disabilities and may escape liability under the ADA while avoiding a duty of fair representation action. 232
If the union pursues a grievance for an employee disadvantaged by
an accommodation made to a disabled employee that violates the collective bargaining agreement, the union may be charged with discrimination or retaliation under the ADA. 233 In addition, the union could be
appeals relied, inter alia, on the union's failure to investigate the grievance to find "sufficient facts
from which bad faith or arbitrary conduct on the part of the local Union could be inferred."). The
Supreme Court did not rule on this portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling. See also Miller v.
Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1980); Tatum v. Frisco Transp. Co., 626 F.2d
55, 59 (8th Cir. 1980); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1470, 1471
(1978), enforced in part, 631 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1980); Beverly Manor Convalescent Ctr., 229
N.L.R.B. 692, 696 (1977). Recent Supreme Court. cases suggest that mere negligence does not
breach the duty of fair representation, however. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct.
1127, 1135 (1991); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990) and
discussion of those cases in Hardin, supra note 48, at 1449-51.
230. The comments to the EEOC regulations state that "[i]n general, reassignment should be
considered only when accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an
undue hardship." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0), app. (1992). In addition, reassignment is available to
current employees only, not to applicants. Id.
231. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
232. The disabled employee might argue that a request by the employer that the union agree to
an accommodation in conflict with the agreement would give the union sufficient knowledge of
the employee's limitations.
233. A discrimination charge could be based on the union's failure to accommodate. See supra
notes 134-37 and accompanying text. See also supra note 163. The union might also be charged
with retaliating against the disabled individual for opposing discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a) (Supp. II 1990). In addition, the union could be charged with breach of the duty of fair
representation owed to the disabled employee. See Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d
1229, 1253 (8th Cir. 1980). The union might argue that the claim under the ADA is preempted by
the NLRA. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 244-47 (noting that some courts have found state laws
barring discrimination against the disabled to be preempted by the NLRA where the claims are
dependent on an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement). Rabin suggests that the ADA is
unclear on this issue. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver, it seems

1994]

ADA AND UNIONS

607

accused of interfering with the disabled individual's exercise of rights
under the Act. 234 A pattern of pursuing grievances in an effort to overturn accommodations might be construed as intentional discrimination
against the disabled.
Furthermore, the union may be politically damaged by inexplicably
favoring one employee over others who have clear contract rights. Such
damage may impair the union's ability to represent all of the employees
effectively, for a divided union may lack sufficient power to negotiate a
favorable agreement. The employer also may be adversely affected by
the increase in both grievances and ADA claims.
The EEOC and the NLRB are aware of the potentially conflicting
obligations under the two statutes, but have provided little guidance. 235
The two agencies recently reached agreement on a procedure coordinating enforcement of the ADA and the NLRA, which provides for consultation between the agencies when charges implicating both statutes are
filed, but provides no substantive guidance for the employers, unions
and employees. 236 The EEOC's substantive guidance, as discussed earunlikely that this argument will prevail. See infra notes 292-302 and accompanying text for
discussion of Gardner-Denver. Rabin's suggestion that these cases should be resolved in one
forum, arbitration, deserves serious consideration, however. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 249-363.
Notably, even if the preemption argument succeeded, the union would still face the duty of fair
representation claim; the employer would face a breach of contract claim. See Miller v. Publishers
Paper Co., 131 L.R.R.M. 2578, 2581-85 (D. Or. 1986). In one of the first NLRB cases raising an
ADA issue, a disabled employee charged that the union breached its duty of fair representation by
refusing to support a transfer for accommodation purposes which would conflict with the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. See Local 876, United Food & Commercial
Workers, 1993 W.L. 257550 (N.L.R.B. G.C. June 23, 1993). The General Counsel refused to
issue a complaint, finding that the union's adherence to the contract was neither motivated by
discrimination, nor was it arbitrary. Id. at 3. The General Counsel decided that the union had a
rational basis for subordinating the interests of the disabled employee to those of other members
of the bargaining unit who would be adversely affected by the transfer. Id. The union had agreed
to other proposed accommodations which were rejected by the employee. Id.
234. See ADA,§ 503(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (Supp. II 1990).
235. See Hunter Speech, supra note 221, at D-1 through D-3; General Counsel's
Memorandum, supra note 218, at B-15; Tension Between Disabilities Act, NLRA "Starving for
Guidance," EEOC Counsel Says, 119 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (June 19, 1992) [hereinafter
EEOC Counsel Speech].
236. While early efforts by the two agencies to issue a joint memorandum of understanding
failed, see Disabilities Act's Conflicts Cause Problems, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. 537, 538-39 (Aug. 24,
1992), talks between the EEOC and NLRB continued. See NLRB Charges Stemming from
Conflicts With ADA Remain Low, Hunter Reports, 150 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) dl5 (Aug. 6,
1993). On November 16, 1993 the EEOC and the NLRB issued a Memorandum of Understanding
Between the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. See NLRB, EEOC Memo of Understanding on Procedure for
Coordinating ADA, NLRA, 220 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) d24 (November 17, 1993) (available on
Westlaw). The memorandum provides for consultation and sharing of information. Id. When a
charge is filed with the NLRB alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain and resolution of the charge
would require interpretation of the charged party's obligations under the ADA, the NLRB General
Counsel has agreed to consult with the EEOC's Office of Legal Counsel regarding the
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lier, is far short of definitive. 237 Similarly, the NLRB General Counsel's
memorandum to the field personnel investigating unfair labor practice
charges offers little help to employers and unions attempting to conform
their conduct to the law. 238 Both agencies and the Congress have left the
issues to be resolved through adjudication. The lack of direction leaves
employers and unions at risk, unable to determine how to comply with
the ADA and the NLRA.
5.

RESOLUTION OF THE ACCOMMODATION DILEMMA

The best solution is a legislative one. Congress should directly
address and clarify the obligations of the union and the employer when
the only available reasonable accommodation conflicts with the collective bargaining agreement. Thorough consideration and resolution of
the union's role under the ADA would eliminate many of the uncertainties and the conflicts with the NLRA. The required administrative
processes under the ADA and the NLRA prevent disputes arising from a
particular set of facts from consolidated resolution in one forum. Therefore, legislative action to clarify the relationship between the two statutes is particularly important beca,use of the potential for conflicting
decisions in the same dispute. 239 Despite the desirability of Congresapplicability of the ADA after completion of the investigation. Id. The same procedure will be
followed when .an individual without a disability files an NLRB charge alleging that an
accommodation to a disabled individual violated the NLRA. Id. Similarly, when the EEOC
receives a charge alleging discrimination that would require interpretation of the charged party's
duties under the NLRA, the EEOC will consult with the NLRB's Division of Advice regarding the
applicability of the NLRA after completion of the investigation. Id. When a duty of fair
representation charge is filed with the NLRB by an individual with a disability and the individual
files a discrimination charge with the EEOC based on the same conduct, the NLRB will dismiss
based on preliminary investigation if possible, but if not, it will defer to the EEOC investigation
for a reasonable period. Id. If the charge is resolved by conciliation, the NLRB will dismiss, but
if not the two agencies will consult and the NLRB will decide whether to proceed with its
investigation or defer for a further time period. Id. If the EEOC finds no cause, the NLRB will
resume its processing of the charge. Id. If an individual files a charge with the NLRB and none
with the EEOC, the NLRB will notify the person of the right to file a charge with the EEOC. Id.
If an EEOC charge is filed, the deferral process described above will be followed. Id.
237. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
238. See General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 218, at B-15 ("Due to the novel and
complex issues involved, any unfair labor practice charge raising issues under the Americans with
Disabilities Act must be referred to the Division of Advice for review.").
239. The existence of two forums for resolution of the same or related disputes may create
difficult issues of preclusion in litigation of the claims. For discussion of preclusion in the context
of administration determinations, see Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling
Administrative Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367 (1990); Joel
deJesus, lnteragency Privity and Claim Preclusion, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 195 (1990); Rex R.
Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral· Estoppel: Limiting Preclusive Effect of Administrative
Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 422 (1983).
Professor Rabin's argument for arbitrating cases involving disability claims and contract
rights attempts to address, in part, the multiple forum problem. See infra note 314. The use of
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sional action, however, reconsideration of the ADA in the near future
appears unlikely. Thus employers, unions, employees, and the courts
and agencies involved must consider other solutions. The recommendations below are directed to these parties, but legislative adoption of the
recommendations remains the best alternative.
a.

The Exculpatory Clause

Congress has suggested that the employer and the union negotiate a
clause in the contract authorizing the employer to take all actions necessary to comply with the ADA. 240 The EEOC Technical Assistance Manual reiterates this suggestion. 241 Agreement to such a provision requires
the union to cede to the employer the authority to act unilaterally in
many areas. Many unions may be unwilling to surrender the right to
bargain about accommodations that might require abrogation of the
agreement. Cessation of the right to bargain over accommodations
would permit the employer to choose the accommodation that violated
the agreement, rather than another accommodation that might be equally
effective. Such freedom could be an effective tool for the employer
desirous of undermining the union and destroying bargaining unit solidarity. Other employers, in good faith, are likely to choose the least
expensive accommodation, regardless of its impact on other employees'
collectively bargained rights. Moreover, because of the confidentiality
requirements, the union might be unable to verify that an employer
action is taken to comply with the statute, thereby increasing the union's
·
reluctance to agree to such a provision. 242
Furthermore, removing the union from the process of determining
appropriate accommodations 243 might limit the range of possible accomarbitration would not necessarily encompass any claims under the NLRA that arose out of the
dispute, however. The NLRB has a policy of deferring to the arbitration procedure cases where
the unfair labor practice claim overlaps with a contractual claim subject to arbitration. See Hardin,
supra note 48, at 1012-82. If a case met the NLRB's standards for deferral, then it might be
resolved in the arbitration process as well. See id. for discussion of the standards for deferral.
240. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 17, at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345;
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 32.
241. See Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 35, at §§ 3.9, 7.Jl(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050.
242. Union agreement to such a provision could eliminate the argument that the union is
entitled to information about the disability in order to comply with the statute's requirements. See
infra notes 248-67 and accompanying text for an argument regarding union entitlement to
information despite the confidentiality provisions.
243. As noted supra notes 215 and 218 and accompanying text, the NLRA requires the
employer to bargain with the union over any changes in terms and conditions of employment. If
the union has clearly and unequivocally waived the right to bargain, however, the employer can
make changes unilaterally. See Rockwell Int'l Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1346, 1347 (1982). The
suggested contract provision appears to be a broad waiver of the right to bargain over
accommodations to the disabled.
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modations considered and impede acceptance of the chosen accommodation by able members of the bargaining unit. Where the union
participates in the process of finding.the appropriate accommodation, it
has a greater chance of convincing any disgruntled members of the bargaining unit of the need for the accommodation.
A union unconcerned about agreement to such a provision, or willing to agree to it in exchange for certain concessions, 244 may still confront grievances from members of the bargaining unit disadvantaged by
particular accommodations. 245 The union must be prepared to respond
to such grievances, perhaps uninformed of the reason for the employer's
action. Duty of fair representation charges and political problems may
be generated. On the other hand, where such a clause is contained in the
agreement, the union can avoid liability for any discriminatory action by
the employer taken pursuant to the agreement. 246 The union would risk
liability only for intentionally discriminatory actions by the union. 247
b.

The Confidentiality Issue

If no exculpatory clause is negotiated, the employer and union must
deal with the impact of the confidentiality provisions. 248 The confidentiality requirements present obstacles to negotiation of any accommodation by the union, the employer, and the disabled employee. They
hinder the union's ability to comply with the ADA and fairly represent
all employees as required by the NLRA. Additionally, the requirements
impose an obligation on the employer that may conflict with the obligation under the NLRA to provide the union with information relevant to
its bargaining duties. 249 This conflict could be minimized by a change
in the regulations allowing the employer to disclose to the union, and to
244. Courts should not find failure to agree to such a provision to be unlawful discrimination
or even evidence of unlawful discrimination. See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
The union should not be required to sacrifice its representation rights or the collectively bargained
rights of the employees that it represents to avoid liability for discrimination. Such a finding
would negate the rights Congress provided in the NLRA.
245. Such grievances could come from able employees adversely affected by an
accommodation or from disabled employees alleging discriminatory treatment.
246. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
247. For example, if the employer refused to accommodate the employee, and the union
refused to process a grievance over that failure because of the employee's disability, then liability
should attach.
248. While the existence of some disabilities is obvious, a disability requiring use of a
wheelchair, for example, other disabilities may not be apparent. See Frierson, supra note 216, at
310. Frierson highlights a number of the potential problems with the confidentiality provisions.
As Frierson notes, insuring that disabled individuals maintain as much privacy as they desire
about their disability is a laudable goal. Id. at 310. For individuals with AIDS, where widespread
fear and discrimination are a reality, nondisclosure may be essential. See Ron Stodghill, II,
Managing AIDS, Bus. WK., February l, 1993, at 48.
249. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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employees affected by any accommodation, sufficient information to
insure both effective negotiation and appropriate accommodation.
In most cases, disclosure to the union will be advantageous to the
disabled employee. The union, which has a duty to represent the disabled employee, can most effectively accomplish that representation if it
is aware of the specific nature of the disability. Furthermore, if the
union talces action adverse to the disabled individual, establishing discrimination will be extraordinarily difficult if the individual cannot
prove the union's knowledge of the disability. In addition, disclosure is
required in order to trigger the union's accommodation obligation under
the statute, for a covered entity must accommodate only "known physical or mental limitations". 25° For these reasons, the employee may
choose to disclose the disability to the union.
In the absence of voluntary disclosure, the statute specifically
authorizes the covered entity to disclose medical information only to
supervisors and managers, first aid and safety personnel, and government officials investigating compliance with the ADA. 251 The EEOC
regulation additionally authorizes release of information to state workers' compensation offices or second injury funds. 252 The comments
emphasize that such disclosure serves purposes that do not conflict with
the ADA. 253 Similarly, disclosure to union officials in order to enable
negotiation of reasonable accommodations does not conflict with the
ADA, but furthers its purposes. Allowing disclosure would enable the
employer and the union to comply with both the NLRA and the ADA. 254
Complete disclosure of all aspects of an employee's disability generally will be unnecessary. Like supervisors and managers, the union
250. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
251. See ADA §§ 102(c)(3)(B), 102(c)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(c)(3)(B), 12112(c)(4)(C)
(Supp. II 1990).
252. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b), app. (1992).
253. Id.
254. Authorization of disclosure does not resolve all of the potential conflicts, but would assist
in reconciling the two statutes. In discussing the statutory conflicts, the NLRB General Counsel
cites a provision in the EEOC regulations stating "it may be a defense to a charge of
discrimination that another Federal law or regulation prohibits an action (including the provision
of a particular reasonable accommodation) that would otherwise be required by this part." See
Hunter Speech, supra note 221, at D-2 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e)). That section could be
interpreted both to excuse accommodation which conflicts with a collective bargaining agreement,
because Section 301 of the NLRA has been interpreted to require compliance with such
agreements, and to allow disclosure when required by the NLRA. In addition, an employer or
union could argue, as a defense to a discrimination action based on a contract provision that is not
clearly unlawful, that unilateral change in the collective bargaining agreement is prohibited by the
NLRA. Because both the comments to the regulation and the section of the House Report cited
therein refer to medical standards and safety requirements, this section may not be interpreted to
provide a defense based on compliance with the NLRA. See supra notes 185-86 and
accompanying text.
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needs to know only the limitations that affect the employee's job, not the
cause of the disability. 255 For example, it should be sufficient that the
union knows that the employee has a disability that requires frequent
rest breaks, not whether the disability results from AIDS, cancer, arthritis or some other cause. Before a duty to accommodate attaches, however, the union is entitled to verification that the employee is a qualified
individual with a disability in need of accommodation.256 Limited disclosure will provide some protection for employees with the legitimate
concern that disclosure of a disability would cause stigma and
discrimination.
Authorization of limited disclosure257 to employees affected by any
accommodation also would resolve some of the statutory problems.
Employees aware of the need for accommodation will be less likely to
grieve any contract violation resulting from the accommodation, and less
likely to charge the union with a failure of the fair representation
duty. 258 Indeed, an employee might volunteer to change shifts,
exchange job duties, or take other accommodating action if he or she is
aware that the action is necessary to allow a disabled colleague to
remain employed. 259 At a minimum, when the union declines to process
the grievance, it should be able to disclose to the able employee the basis
for its decision. This would avoid unnecessary litigation.
The EEOC should amend the regulation to permit the same disclosure to unions and to affected employees that is authorized for supervisors and managers. While the regulation might be challenged as
contrary to the statute, which lists specific exceptions to the disclosure
prohibition, the regulation should be upheld as consistent with the statutory purpose and necessary to enable the union's compliance with its
duty of reasonable accommodation. 260
2SS. The statute and regulations provide that "supervisors and managers may be informed
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary
accommodations." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(c)(3)(B)(i), 12112(c)(4)(C) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1630.14 (c)(l)(i), 1630.14(d)(l)(i) (1992).
2S6. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (app.) (1992).
257. Employees need only know that the actions taken by the employer with respect to the
disabled employee constitute an accommodation under the ADA which has been discussed with
and agreed to by the union.
258. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 28-29 (citing Wolfe, Disability is No Hardship for
du Pont (study showed that "[f]ellow employees did not resent necessary accommodations made
for employees with disabilities")).
2S9. See, e.g., Chris Fiscus, American Expresses Its Support, Arizona Business Gazette, July S,
1991at13 (American Express has more employees than necessary who have volunteered to assist
disabled employees); Expansion of Government Leave Programs Urged, 143 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) !SS (May 31, 1993) (federal government pilot programs that allow employees to donate
their annual leave time to others with health problems requiring extended absence have worked
well).
260. See National Confectioners Ass'n v. Califano, S69 F.2d 690, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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. Even absent amendment, the courts should interpret the statute to
allow the disclosure required to make an effective accommodation. 261 If
the employer262 discloses only information necessary to effectuate an
accommodation, a court should find no breach of the confidentiality
requirements. 263 Alternatively, if the employee refuses to authorize the
employer to disclose to the union or affected employees the information
necessary to negotiate and implement an accommodation, then the
eqiployer should prevail in a complaint for failure to accommodate. 264 It
would b.e an undue hardship for the employer to violate the NLRA in
order to accommodate the employee. The employer would be unable to
bargain with the union about the accommodation without at least limited
disclosure. 265 In order to succeed with this defense, however, the
employer should be required to show both that it attempted to obtain the
employee's agreement to disclosure and that no accommodation that did
not require disclosure was available. 266
The confidentiality provisions of the statute would be further limited if interpreted to apply only to information obtained in the course of
a medical examination. Such an interpretation comports with the statu261. See Frierson, supra note 216, at 311.
262. The same rule should apply to the union if it discloses information to employees affected
by an accommodation.
263. Information necessary to effectuate an accommodation would include telling employees
who will be affected by an accommodation that the action is taken to accommodate a disabled
employee. Such disclosure is necessary to prevent morale problems, grievances, and duty of fair
representation complaints.
264. The employer should prevail only with respect to the particular accommodation, however.
If any other reasonable accommodation is available that could be implemented without disclosure
and undue hardship, the employer would be required to make such an accommodation. As the
NLRB General Counsel suggests, "putting a desk on blocks, providing a ramp [or] adding braille
signage" probably would not be changes in terms and conditions of employment that would
require bargaining with the union. Hunter Speech, supra note 221, at D-1. Nor should such
changes adversely affect other employees.
265. As noted earlier, the employer would violate the NLRA by not bargaining with the union
about the accommodation, by unilaterally modifying the collective bargaining agreement, and by
refusing to give the union relevant information about the accommodation. See supra notes 215-20
and accompanying text.
266. See Frierson, supra note 216, at 311; supra note 264. Encouraging the employer to
request authorization from the employee creates a risk that the employer will coerce employees to
reveal confidential information under threat· of termination for inability to accommodate. Id. In
fact, however, the statute creates the problem because knowledge is required to trigger the
accommodation and nondiscrimination obligations. In situations where the only available
accommodation requires agreement of, or accommodation by, the union, the employee must
choose to disclose or forego the accommodation. As noted earlier, however, disclosure can be
limited to what is necessary to trigger the accommodation obliga~ion and effectuate the
accommodation. Efforts to coerce unnecessary disclosure or to avoid accommodation by failing
to explain to the employee the need for disclosure and the limited nature of the disclosure would
constitute unlawful discrimination.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

614

[Vol. 48:567

tory language. 267 If the employer or the union obtained information
about the employee's disability from other sources, the confidentiality
requirements would not apply. If the employer initially learned about
the disability from the examination, however, and in following up on the
examination received additional information from the employee or other
sources, there is a persuasive argument that all of the information should
be protected as confidential. Absent the examination, the employer
would not have had the medical data. This interpretation of the statute
might allow the employer to reveal some data about the disability to the
union or other employees for accommodation purposes without risk of
violating the ADA.
Interpreting the ADA to allow the disclosure necessary to effectuate
accommodations relieves some of the problems posed by the duty to
accommodate in the unionized workplace. Most importantly, it allows
the employer, the union, and the disabled employee to jointly achieve an
appropriate accommodation that accomplishes the goals of the ADA
while protecting the rights of other employees. A significant remaining
issue, however, is whether accommodation is required when it conflicts
with a provision of the existing collective bargaining agreement.
c.

Conflicts Between Accommodations and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement

Although several commentators have argued that the duty of
accommodation should outweigh a conflicting provision of the collective bargaining agreement, 268 few have considered thoroughly the
problems faced by the employer and the union when confronted by the
dual obligations, particularly conflicts with the NLRA. 269 While significant weight should be given to the need for accommodation in light of
267. The statute states that "[a] covered entity may require a medical examination ... if ...
information obtained regarding the medical condition or history of the applicant is collected and
maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical
record ...." ADA § 102(c)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3) (Supp. II 1990). The provisions for
medical examinations of employees are subject to the same conditions. See ADA§ 102(c)(4)(C);
42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(C) (Supp. II 1990).
268. See Bales, supra note 2, at 203; Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act:
Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 51 BROOK.
L. REV. 1237, 1257-59; Barbara Kamenir Frankel, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 257, 283-84 (1992). Cf.
Stahlhut, supra note 208, at 93-95 (advocating a balancing of rights); Ervin, supra note 38, at 97172 (urging a balancing, but arguing for greater weight on the disabled employee's right to
accommodation); David S. Doty, The Impact of Federal Labor Policy on the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1055, 1088-89 (1992) (suggesting that
reassignment in violation of the collective bargaining agreement should be considered); Smith,
supra note 183, at 282-83 (arguing that the collective bargaining agreement should prevail).
269. See supra notes 214-34 and accompanying text.
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the purposes of the ADA, the NLRA and collective bargaining agreements negotiated thereunder must also weigh in the balance. The legislative history of the ADA and the language of the EEOC regulations
suggest that Congress did not contemplate that a conflict with the collective bargaining agreement, without more, constitutes undue hardship.
The concern raised throughout the legislative history, the regulations,
and the cases under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII is the impact of
accommodation on the collectively bargained rights of other employees.
While every accommodation that conflicts with the contract violates the rights of employees protected by the agreement in a broad
sense, many accommodations will not infringe directly on any
employee's contractually based expectations. For example, allowing a
supervisor to perform some marginal tasks within the disabled
employee's job description may violate a contractual ban on supervisors
engaging in bargaining unit work. The contract provision furnishes
important protection for employees against erosion of bargaining unit
jobs. A limited waiver of the provision to allow accommodation of a
disabled employee, however, does not significantly threaten the bargaining unit, nor does it infringe on any employee's expectations about his
or her own job, or a job to which the employee is entitled under the
seniority provisions of the agreement. Similarly, a contractual provision
for two fifteen-minute breaks and one thirty minute lunch period each
day gives important rights to unit employees. Allowing a disabled
employee more breaks may violate the agreement, but does not interfere
with any employee's right to the rest periods guaranteed by the
agreement.
While the employer should be required to bargain with the union
about these accommodations, the conflict between the accommodation
and the agreement should not constitute an undue hardship excusing
such an accommodation. Thus, an employer or union's refusal to agree
to such an accommodation would be an unlawful failure to accommodate absent unusual circumstances.270 Additionally, failure to process a
270. If the employer's action was part of a pattern of eroding the bargaining unit by using
supervisors to perform bargaining unit work, for example, then the union's opposition to such an
accommodation would not be unlawful. See Eastern Slope Rural Tel. Ass'n, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 986 (1983) (Maclean, Arb.) and Bell Tel. Co., 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 750 (1980)
(Garrett, Arb.) for examples of arbitration cases involving use of nonmembers of the bargaining
unit to do bargaining unit work.
Where one party refuses to agree to such an accommodation, the employee can file a charge
for failure to accommodate with the EEOC. See ADA,§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. II
1990) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 706(b) (1988)). Only the objecting party should be found liable.
Any other rule would penalize the union when it was willing to agree and had no way to
implement the accommodation on its own. In addition, the employer willing to accommodate
would be forced to choose between risking liability under the ADA or implementing the
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grievance challenging the accommodation would not violate the duty of
fair representation. In order to reconcile the ADA with the NLRA,
which privileges refusal to negotiate about or agree to modifications of a
collective bargaining agreement during its term, the rule would not
apply where a reasonable accommodation was available that did not
conflict with the collective bargaining agreement. 271 Thus, neither the
employer nor the union would violate the ADA by refusing to agree to
an accommodation that violated the agreement unless no other effective
accommodation was possible.
On the other hand, an accommodation that would restructure an
able employee's job, force an able employee to change shifts, or deny an
able employee a job to which he or she would be entitled under the
agreement significantly impacts the able employee's contractual
rights. 272 While the employer, the union, and the disabled employee,
accommodation over the objection of the union and risking an unfair labor practice charge for
unilateral change or a grievance for violating the agreement. While it is unlikely that the NLRB
would find that the type of accommodations encompassed by this rule would rise to the level of an
unlawful unilateral change, the employer should not be forced assume such a risk.
271. Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides that neither party is required to discuss or agree to any
modification of the contract which is to become effective before the contract allows those terms
and conditions to be reopened. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). The ADA's duty to accommodate
seems to require the parties to discuss any variation in the contract terms that might be an
appropriate accommodation, however, at least if no other accommodation is available. See
Stephen M. Crow & Sandra J. Hartman, ADA Versus NLRA: Is a Showdown Imminent Over
Reasonable Accommodation?, 44 Lab. L.J. 375, 378 (1993). The rule proposed here would
require agreement, not to contract modification, but to a waiver of the contractual requirements for
purposes of accommodation under limited circumstances. The bargaining requirement may be
justified, although it requires discussion of waiver of existing contract terms, because disability
discrimination is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Hardin, supra note 48, at 901-02 n.302.
272. Bales suggests that since reassignment is considered only when no other reasonable
accommodation is available, the disabled employee seeking reassignment should be
accommodated regardless of the agreement because the alternative is discharge. See Bales, supra
note 2, at 203. While accommodation ensuring immediate continued employment is preferable,
where unavailable because of another employee's entitlement to the job, the employee with a
disability could be placed on medical leave for the time necessary to obtain another position for
which he or she is qualified. If the agreement limits medical leave, extension of the leave would
be a violation of the agreement that would not adversely affect the rights of other employees. This
is not a perfect solution if the leave is unpaid, but it provides an alternative that ensures continuing
employment.
It should also be noted that these accommodations will not inevitably conflict with the
collective bargaining agreement. A particular agreement might give the employer the right to
change job duties unilaterally. Under other circumstances, the disabled employee might have
sufficient seniority to obtain a favorable shift or job.
Courts adjudicating both Title VII and constitutional discrimination claims have a history of
protecting the legitimate expectations of existing employees. See International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Where necessary to provide a
remedy to identified victims of discrimination, however, courts have tolerated some interference
with such expectations, particularly when the expectations were created in part by the
discrimination. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Sys., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (discriminatees entitled
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might voluntarily agree to effectuate such an accommodation, the conflict with the able employee's rights under the agreement would constitute undue hardship excusing the accommodation. This test provides a
clear guide for the employer and the union as to when accommodation is
required, while encouraging the parties to negotiate an accommodation
satisfactory to all. 273
In certain types of accommodation cases, the employer and the
union that fail to accommodate in violation of the agreement might
invoke a second defense. If the employee requests reassignment to, or
an applicant assignment to, a job that is not available under the agreement because of the disabled employee's lack of seniority or lack of
experience in other jobs, then the employee is not a qualified individual
with a disability under the statute. 274 In order to prevail in such a case,
the disabled employee or applicant must show that the qualification
requirements that bar the individual are unlawful because they were
adopted or applied with discriminatory intent275 or they have an unjustified discriminatory impact. 276
Some may criticize this solution as insufficiently protecting disabled employees. The solution may, in fact, prevent accommodation of
some disabled employees. 277 Predictions of substantial adverse effects
for disabled employees, however, presume union insensitivity to the
to award of seniority retroactive to the date on which the discriminatory refusal to hire occurred);
Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bumping innocent employee permissible to
remedy Title VII violation). But cf. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1983)
(bumping of innocent employee not permissible). It is clear that the ADA does not require
bumping in order to accommodate. See ADA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. II 1990).
273. Both Stahlhut and Ervin propose case by case balancing approaches that take into account
·the interests of the disabled employee and those of other employees who would be affected by an
accommodation. See Stahlhut, supra note 208, at 93-5; Ervin, supra note 38, at 970-71. The ad
hoc balancing approaches are appealing for their flexibility, but they provide far less guidance for
the parties than the test advocated here and will create more litigation. The union and the
employer remain free to balance the interests in each case and make an accommodation
agreement, however.
274. The definition of the term "qualified individual with a disability" could be clarified in the
EEOC regulations to include satisfaction of the seniority requirements for the position. Currently,
the regulations define the term as "an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill,
experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such
individual holds or desires." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992). While the regulation as written
would cover job-related seniority requirements, specific inclusion of seniority, along with skill,
experience and education would clarify the issue.
275. See ADA, § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 1990).
276. See ADA §§ 102(b)(3), (6), (7), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(3), (6), (7) (Supp. II 1990).
277. Interestingly, however, while the accommodation duty has been called the centerpiece of
the law, only 20% of the ADA cases filed with the EEOC in 1992 alleged failure to accommodate.
Statement by Christopher Bell, Acting Associate Legal Counsel, Americans with Disabilities Act
Services, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, at ALI-ABA Video Law Review,
Americans with Disabilities Act (December 10, 1992).
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needs of disabled employees. While the passage of the ADA and the
evidence presented in support of its enactment demonstrate widespread
discrimination against disabled individuals, the legislative history
reflects no testimony regarding union discrimination. Indeed, unions
actively supported passage of the statute. 278 Even before passage of the
ADA many unions negotiated contractual protections for disabled
employees. 279 Furthermore, seniority requirements for reassignment, the
most frequently cited area of potential conflict, will not bar many disabled employees because older, longer service employees are more
likely to be disabled than younger employees. 280
278. See Sam F. Parigi et al., Labor Law and the Future of Organized Labor under the Clinton
Administration, 44 LAB. L.J. 313, 313 (1993); Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, International
President, AFSCME, to Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer, EEOC 1 (April 29, 1991) (on file
with EEOC in Comments on the EEOC Proposed Regulations on Title I of the ADA); George J.
Kourpias, Comments of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers on
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the
Americans with Disabilities Act 3 (April 29, 1991) (on file with the EEOC); Unions Are Not in
Conflict with ADA, Conference Attendees Told, 92 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at d7 (May 14, 1993)
(unions have traditionally worked for the employment rights of employees with disabilities);
Unions Said Likely to Have to Bow to ADA in Conflicts Over Seniority, 63 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
at A-8 (April 5, 1993) (unions are part of the solution to disability discrimination); Union
Contract Provisions May Conflict With Federal Disability Act Obligations, 13 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) at A-5 (January 21, 1992) (labor movement was one of the groups lobbying for disability
rights act).
279. See Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 922-23 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (collective bargaining
agreement provides for reassignment to light duty status for ill or injured full-time regular or parttime flexible employee with 5 years of service, or any such employee injured on the job regardless
of years of service); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 27 M.S.P.R. 426, 428 (1985)
(collective bargaining agreement requires Postal Service to reassign to light duty employees
disabled by injury at work); see also Waterous Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 278, 280, 281, 284
(1993) (Reynolds, Arb.) (under contract in effect prior to effective date of ADA, arbitrator ordered
employer to assign employee disabled by occupational injury to light duty work); Iowa Elec. Light
& Power Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 393, 399 (1993) (Pelofsky, Arb.) (contract prohibits
disability discrimination and arbitrator held that learning disabled employee was unjustly
discharged for failing to pass hazardous materials test because company did not determine the
nature of the disability and tailor instruction to the disability); Madison Adult Education Dist., 100
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 450, 455-56 (1993) (Johnson, Arb.) (employer violated disability
discrimination clause of collective bargaining agreement by failing to reasonably accommodate
disabled employee with a transfer to a vacant position); USS-Minnesota Ore Operations, 100 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 791, 794 (1993) (agreement contained provisions authorizing the company and
union to disregard seniority rights in the job placement of disabled employees by mutual
agreement). The first two cases involved postal service unions. The latter four cases involved
locals of the International Association of Machinists, the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, the American Federation of Teachers, and the United Steelworkers respectively.
For a discussion of the potential of unions in resolving discrimination issues for employees,
see Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L. REv.
779, 827-28 (1992).
280. A common scenario raising the issue of accommodation is placement of employees
returning from medical leaves or absences due to work-related injuries. See Jane B. Stranch,
Rights and Duties of Organized Labor Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, at 17
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (majority of EEOC claims in the Tennessee area
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Educational efforts can further aid in accommodation. Many
national unions have developed educational materials regarding employees with disabilities. 281 All employees risk becoming disabled at some
point in their working lives, whether through disease or injury. Awareness of this significant possibility will help to convince employees to
support both contractual protections and reasonable accommodations for
disabled employees. 282 As a result, unions will be better able to represent the disabled members of the bargaining unit and equalize their
rights with those of able employees. 283
A determination, whether legislative or judicial, that an accommodation adversely affecting the collectively bargained rights of other
employees creates undue hardship might discourage unions and employers from voluntarily negotiating such an accommodation. The union,
however, owes a duty of fair representation to both disabled and able
employees and therefore must determine, in good faith and based on the
merits of the issues involved, whether to seek or agree to
accommodation. 284
Ideally, the parties should obtain the agreement of any affected
employees to the accommodation. This would both obviate morale
problems and eliminate grievances and duty of fair representation complaints. Absent agreement by .the affected employee(s), the union and
the employer should still be permitted to agree to an accommodation.
The employer would be protected from a breach of contract claim by the
are coming from employees who are or have been disabled, not from applicants). Anecdotal
evidence from practicing attorneys available to the author suggests that the Tennessee experience
is not atypical. Those most likely to be affected adversely by seniority requirements are disabled
applicants seeking jobs for which the employer does not hire at the entry level. Since applicants
have no right to reassignment, those individuals would not have a claim unless the employer's
requirements for the non-entry level jobs were found to be discriminatory, either intentionally or
by virtue of an unjustified disparate impact.
281. See Frierson, supra note 216, at 311.
282. Many unions have already negotiated such protections. For example, '(6(a) of the UAWGeneral Motors National Agreement states:
It is the policy. of General Motors arid the UAW that the provisions of this
Agreement be applied to all employes covered by this Agreement without
discrimination based on race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin or handicap.
Any claims of violation of this policy or claims of sexual harassment may be taken
up as a grievance ....
See supra note 279 for other examples of union-negotiated protections for disabled employees.
283. See Smith, supra note 183, at 283.
284. See id. at 280. Ervin suggests a number of factors that should be considered in making
the decision. See Ervin, supra note 38, at 969. The recent decision of the NLRB General Counsel
in Local 876, United Food and Commercial Workers, 1993 W.L. 257550 (N.L.R.B. G.C. June 23,
1993) recognizes that a union that decides in good faith and without discriminatory motive not to
agree to an accommodation in violation of the collective bargaining agreement does not breach its
duty of fair representation. See supra note 233.
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union's agreement. 285 The union might be vulnerable to a duty of fair
representation claim from any employee adversely affected by the
accommodation, however. The NLRB or the courts faced with such a
claim should find for the union unless hostility or discrimination against
the able employee motivated the union's action. 286 A decision to
accommodate in violation of the agreement may not be arbitrary. Similarly a decision to rely on the doctrine of undue hardship should protect
both the employer and the union unless the disabled employee could
demonstrate that intentional discrimination motivated the decision. 287
The suggested interpretation of the statute may also be criticized as
insufficiently protecting free collective bargaining. Effectively, the proposed solution requires violation of the negotiated agreement in certain
circ;umstances. The interference with the agreement is limited in scope,
however. Viewed as a whole, this proposal sustains the collective bargaining system by insuring an important role for the union in negotiating
accommodations for disabled employees.
The proposed standards would be most effectively implemented by
legislative or regulatory action, providing clear guidance to the parties.
Absent clarifying legislation or rulemaking, the courts and the NLRB
should interpret the ADA and the NLRA as set forth above. The interpretation is consistent with the statutory language and legislative history
of the ADA and resolves many of the conflicts created by the accommodation obligation while protecting the rights of both employees with disabilities and employees without disabilities. A clearly defined standard
will limit the potential floodgate of litigation over these issues under
both the AD A and the NLRA, thereby reducing the burdens on the
285. The employer might lose the protection if the union were found to have violated the duty
of fair representation, however. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 569
(1976) (where union has breached its duty of fair representation, contractual remedy against the
employer is not foreclosed by failure to exhaust grievance procedure or final and binding
arbitration award).
286. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967) (union breaches the duty of fair
representation if its conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith).
287. The fact that the union and the employer negotiate in an attempt to reach agreement on an
accommodation that would violate the agreement should not waive their right to assert the undue
hardship defense if no agreement is reached. Such an interpretation would discourage efforts to
negotiate accommodations, thereby interfering with the goals of the statute. Should the union and
employer disagree, one party willing to accommodate in violation of the agreement and the other
unwilling, both should be protected against any claim of discrimination by the undue hardship
defense. The union, however, might be able to file a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement if the agreement contains contractual rights for the disabled employee. The arbitrator
would have to determine whether the agreement's protection against disability discrimination
required accommodation. The employer's only recourse, if it desires to accommodate in violation
of the agreement, would be to act unilaterally and risk a grievance or unfair labor practice charge.
The employer should not be privileged to act unilaterally by virtue of the union's failure to agree
to a violation of the agreement that would adversely affect another employee.
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administrative agencies and the courts. 288 In addition, the standard best
accommodates the policies of both statutes, prohibiting discrimination
against employees with disabilities while preserving the collective bargaining system established by the NLRA.
G.

The ADA and Grievance Arbitration

Almost all collective bargaining agreements contain a grievance
procedure that culminates in binding arbitration. 289 Typically, the arbitration procedure encompasses disputes regarding the meaning and
application of the agreement. 290 Many contracts contain provisions
relating to disability; arbitrating disputes involving disability issues is
not uncommon. 291 The potential for ADA liability may encourage
unions to negotiate additional protections for employees with disabilities
and to arbitrate more grievances over violations of these contractual provisions. 292 The ADA expressly encourages the use of alternative dispute
resolution, including arbitration, to resolve disputes under the statute. 293
The contractual grievance and arbitration procedure can· provide an
effective means of resolving disability issues. This avoids the necessity
of a lengthy and expensive federal court action. 294
If the union arbitrates or seeks to arbitrate an issue that is also covered by the ADA and the employee files suit under the statute, the court
must determine · how the arbitration decision will effect the statutory
claim. Precedent under Title VII suggests that the employee is entitled
to pursue the judicial action regardless of the outcome of the arbitration
or the existence of an arbitral remedy. 295 In Alexander v. Gardner-Den288. The proposals for interpretation of the statute suggested here are designed to work as a
comprehensive scheme. If all of the decisionmaking bodies involved do not adopt the suggested
interpretations, the goal of minimizing litigation will not be achieved and conflicting decisions
will persist. In addition, the NLRB and the EEOC should continue to work together in an effort to
come to agreement about treatment of these issues. The recent memorandum of understanding is
a step in the right direction. See supra note 236. The NLRB should also consider refusing to
defer to arbitration cases involving ADA issues that would otherwise be deferred until the law in
this area is established by the agencies and courts. See discussion of the NLRB's deferral policy
in Hardin, supra note 48, at 1012-84. On the other hand, if the parties are able to resolve the
entire dispute in arbitration, deferral might be appropriate. See discussion of Rabin's proposal
infra note 314. The General Counsel has indicated an intent to follow the normal deferral policy
is cases involving ADA issues. See General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 218, at n.18.
289. See supra note 56.
290. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) § 51:261 (Jan. 11, 1993).
291. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 279.
292. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
293. See ADA§ 513, 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. II 1990).
294. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 248-49.
295. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). But cf Bender v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (securities broker required to arbitrate claims of
gender discrimination under Title VII pursuant to arbitration clause in broker registration
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ver Company, 296 the United States Supreme Court held that the
employee was entitled to pursue an action in federal court alleging race
discrimination under Title VII despite an arbitration decision finding
that he was discharged for just cause. 297 The issue of race discrimination had been raised before the arbitrator, but was not mentioned in the
decision. 298 The Court found that the employee was entitled to a trial de
novo because the two proceedings differed significantly.299 The arbitration dealt with contractual rather than statutory issues and the arbitrator's function was to determine the intent of the parties, rather than to
resolve statutory claims. 300 Additionally, the arbitration was informal
and did not contain the procedural safeguards of judicial proceedings. 301
In further support of its decision, the Court noted the union's control
over the grievance procedure, which might result in subordination of the
individual grievant's interest to the collective interests of the bargaining
unit.302
Because the ADA adopted the enforcement procedures and remedies of Title VII,303 there is a strong argument that the Gardner-Denver
rule should apply. Yet, the Court there noted that "Title VII does not
speak expressly to the relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective bargaining agreements."304
While the ADA does not expressly mention arbitration under collective
agreement); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).
Initially, the district court and the court of appeals denied Dean Witter's demand for arbitration
pursuant to the agreement signed by Alford. 712 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 905 F.2d 104
(5th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Alford in light of Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). The court of appeals remanded to the District Court,
939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), which dismissed the plaintiffs claims with an order to arbitrate.
975 F.2d at 1161. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Id. See also Newton v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 141 L.R.R.M. 2477 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (arbitration under Railway Labor Act
requires dismissal of Title VII claim of railroad employee); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co.,
No. 92-12774-T, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10255 (D.C. Mass. 1993) (insurance sales agent required
to arbitrate gender discrimination claim pursuant to arbitration clause in her agent contract).
296. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
297. 415 U.S. at 44. The Court rejected arguments that the employee had foregone his
statutory claim by virtue of election of remedies or waiver. Id. at 49. The Court later reached the
same result in cases involving statutory claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450
U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
298. 415 U.S. at 42.
299. Id. at 52. The Court did note that the arbitration decision could be admitted into evidence
and accorded the weight that the court deemed appropriate. Id. at 59-60.
300. Id. at 53. The Court noted that arbitrators are chosen for their expertise in industrial
relations, not their legal expertise. Id. at 52.
301. Id. at 57-58.
302. Id. at 58 n.19.
303. ADA§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. II 1990).
304. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). The 1991 Civil Rights Act,
which amended Title VII, added a provision encouraging alternative dispute resolution which is
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bargaining agreements, it does encourage the use of arbitration "where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law."305
Given this express sanction of arbitration, courts could follow the
approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 306 In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that an individual
employee who had signed an arbitration agreement as a part of his application for registration with the New York Stock Exchange was bound to
arbitrate a statutory claim of age discrimination. 307 The Gilmer Court
rejected the argument that arbitration is procedurally and substantively
inadequate to resolve statutory disputes; an argument that had influenced
the Gardner-Denver Court. 308 The Court also distinguished GardnerDenver, however, noting first that the employees there, unlike Gilmer,
had not agreed to arbitrate statutory claims and thus, the arbitrator had
no authority to resolve such claims. 309 Second, the Gilmer Court noted
the absence of the tension between collective and individual rights
because Gilmer involved a nonunion workplace. 310 The final differentiating factor mentioned by the Court was that the Gardner-Denver case
was decided under Title VII, not the Federal Arbitration Act, which
"reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' " 311
Gilmer followed the Court's recent trend favoring arbitration of
statutory disputes. 312 Nevertheless, and despite the language in the
identical to Section 513 of the ADA. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, Section 118,
42 U.S.C. § 1981, note (Supp. III 1991).
305. ADA § 513, 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. II 1990).
306. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
307. Id. at 1650.
308. Id. at 1654. The Court did examine the arbitration procedures at issue, finding them
satisfactory, thus suggesting that in the absence of certain protections, arbitration of statutory
claims might inadequately protect statutory rights. Id. at 1655.
309. Id. at 1655-57.
310. Id. at 1655. The Court seemed to elevate this concern in Gilmer, since in GardnerDenver it was relegated to a footnote. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19
(I 974). In Barrentine, however, which followed Gardner-Denver but preceded Gilmer, the Court
emphasized its concern about the potential for divergence between the interests of the union,
which is required to balance individual and collective interests, and the interests of the grievant.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981).
311. Id. at 1657 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 625 (1985)). Commentators on Gilmer have speculated about whether it will be applied to
require arbitration under employment agreements, since the Federal Arbitration Act states that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.'' 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
See, e.g., James A. King, Jr. et al., Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB. LAW. 97, 10714 (1993); Plass, supra note 279, at 792-94; James A. Burstein & Kenneth D. Schwartz, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: The Supreme Coun Endorses Arbitration of Age
Discrimination Claims, 17 EMP. REL. L.J. 173, 181-83 (1991); Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of
Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 753, 753-54 (1990).
312. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
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ADA encouraging arbitration, the Gilmer Court's distinction of Gardner-Denver suggests that arbitration of a contractual disability claim
under the collective bargaining agreement should not preclude adjudication of the statutory claim. 313 The reasoning of the Gardner-Denver
Court remains persuasive with respect to statutory discrimination
claims. 314 Application of the Gardner-Denver rule to ADA claims is
consistent with the legislative history, which indicates that Congress did
not intend for Section 513 of the ADA to preclude litigation, even where
there is a contractual agreement to arbitrate. 315
Because unions will be encouraged to negotiate contractual provisions regarding disability discrimination and to arbitrate grievances
under those provisions, both to protect disabled employees and to avoid
liability under the ADA, this rule may provide a disabled employee with
two bites at the apple, one in arbitration and one in court. Although dual
litigation will be costly to the employer and to the adjudicatory system,
such a rule will further the statutory purpose of eradicating disability
discrimination. Furthermore, if the employee prevails in arbitration, he
or she may decline to proceed under the ADA, resulting in savings of
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S.
614.
313. See Plass, supra note 279, at 779 for a suggestion that the courts may rely on language
encouraging arbitration in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to "accommodate and defer to arbitral
resolution of Title VII disputes on a broad scale." See also Arbitrators Told to Be Sensitive to
Workforce Diversity, Perceptions, 110 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at d21 (June 10, 1993) (reporting
on presentations at the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators suggesting that
arbitrators will be hearing more discrimination cases); Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees
Need for New Direction At Overwhelmed Agency, l ll Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at d3 (June l l,
1993) (EEOC General Counsel suggests greater use of alternative dispute resolution as one
method of reducing the overload of cases at the underfunded, understaffed agency). Cf. Wendy S.
Tien, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled, 77 MINN. L. Rev.
1443 (1993) (compulsory binding arbitration of ADA claims is inconsistent with Congressional
intent and the policies underlying the ADA, and it is not required by the Federal Arbitration Act
which broadly excludes employment contracts).
314. As noted by Professor Estreicher, the most persuasive reason for following the Gardner·
Denver rule is that the union has no authority to waive or compromise the employee's statutory
rights. See Estreicher, supra note 311, at 780-81. See also Rabin, supra note 2, at 227 (key for
the Court in Gardner-Denver was that employee could not be bound by union's prospective
waiver of public rights). For a recent case holding that arbitration under the Railway Labor Act
does not bar judicial consideration of discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, see
Bates V; Long Island R.R. Co., No. 92-9308, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 16259 (2d Cir. July 2, 1993).
Professor Rabin's article makes an appealing argument for utilizing arbitration for claims
involving both public and private rights, such as cases where the right to accommodation conflicts
with seniority rights under the agreement. The proposal would involve some changes in the
existing arbitral system and in the scope of judicial review. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 242-62.
315. See Legislative History, supra note 181, Vol.I, at 516-17 (''The Committee believes that
the approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. applies
equally to the ADA and does not intend that Section 513 be used to preclude rights and remedies
that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities").
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time and expense for both the parties and the administrative and judicial
systems. 316
IV.

CONCLUSION

Application of the Americans With Disabilities Act to the unionized workplace raises issues unique to that setting. The existing statutory and regulatory guidance for employers and unions striving to
comply with ADA obligations is limited. Ideally, Congress should
address the problem by clarifying the union's obligations under the
ADA and resolving the conflicts between the ADA and the NLRA, two
important Congressional mandates. Since Congressional revisitation of
the statutes is unlikely, however, this Article suggests regulatory and
judicial interpretations of the statute that would resolve much of the
ambiguity and provide clearer guidance for employers, unions and disabled employees. The suggested interpretations attempt to reconcile the
ADA and the NLRA without sacrificing the goals of either statute. At
the same time, the proposals attempt to draw some clear lines to minimize uncertainty and therefore, litigation. ·
Unions can play an important role in enforcing the rights of disabled employees and in educating the entire workforce about how to
accommodate the disabled. If they seize the opportunity to do so, it will
be a significant step toward eradication of disability discrimination.

316. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines
and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 537 (1992). Arbitration is generally less expensive than
litigation. Id. at 525. An employee who wins in arbitration may choose to litigate, however, for
the statute provides remedies for intentional discrimination that are generally unavailable in
arbitration, such as compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a)(2), (b) (1988 &
Supp. Ill 1991); Summers, supra, at 527. Compensatory and punitive damages are not, however,
available in disparate impact cases or in cases involving failure to provide reasonable
accommodation where the employer can show good faith efforts to make such accommodation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a)(l),(3) (1988 & Supp. Ill 1991).

